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INTRODUCTION 
The  pervasive tendency of open-access fisheries to expand effort to the point where 
resource rent is dissipated, first pointed out by Gordon (1954) and then by many others 
after  him,  has been a major cause of  concern within the sector all over the world.  In 
many fisheries, the tendency to overexploit the resources has driven stocks to levels 
below their  (maximum yield)  potential and has worsened economic conditions of the 
fishing communities depending on these resources. 
The fisheries of  Bangladesh contribute 71% of  the  animal protein supply of the 
country.  Nearly one-tenth (1  0 million) of  the country's population is involved as part-time 
and full-time workers  in fishing and related activities. The inland fisheries employ nearly 
one million full-time fishers  (BBS  1986; World Bank 1991). 
The  conditions of  the inland capture fisheries of  Bang!adesh have deteriorated in 
recent years and production  has either stagnated or even decreased for some major 
species  (DOFIBFRSS  1985, 1986,  1991). On the other  hand, the fishing-dependent 
population  has been on the  increase, signifying a mounting pressure on the available 
fisheries resources (BBS 1989 and previous issues).  The traditional system of 
administering fisheries activities is insufficient to  maintain production from the various 
fisheries and,  more importantly, to the task of  maintaining the flow  of  benefits that the 
fisheries are capable of  generating. 
In Bangladesh, most of  the inland fisheries exploitation activities are small-scale and 
traditional.  Over the years, these fisheries have retained an open-access character in 
the absence of  a consistent and effective management policy. For a long time the 
fisheries  had been managed by a group of  middlemen who secured yearly  leases from 
the government through auctions. Consequently, an increasingly large fishing dependent 
population and an excess fishing effort relative to the availability of  stock  have 
contributed to declining  catches of  some or all species and a deteriorating fishing 
income. These fisheries will require some kind of  control of  effort in order to improve 
their  economic performance. 
In response to these  problems, a comprehensive policy for  inland fisheries 
management is in the process of  implementation by the government. The objective  of 
this  New Fisheries Management Policy (NFMP) is mainly to redirect the potential 
benefits of  fisheries exploitation activities to "actual fishers"  and at the same time 
maintaining and improving the productivity of the fisheries on a sustainable  basis.  In 
this  effort, a system of  licensing of  water bodies to actual fishers or groups of fishers 
has been introduced in selected areas  of inland fisheries. This would  replace the 
traditional system of  leasing out the water bodies to private individuals. The economic 
consequences of  these  new practices are yet to be addressed (Aguero et al.  1989). 
A  major problem confronting management policies is the determination of  the type 
and level of  control which should be applied to the fisheries  in order to achieve best 
the  above  objectives. This necessitates the  understanding of  the  performance-response 
of  the fisheries to alternative management policies in terms of  the  resultant impact on 
the beneficiaries  or  users of  the  resources, i.e.,  the fishers,  the trading community and 
the consumers. The principal objective of this research was to develop a bioeconomic model that 
would provide a basis for assessment of  economic consequences of various alternative 
management measures for the inland fisheries of  Bangladesh. 
Resources Externalities and Economic Inefficiency 
in Open-Access Fisheries 
In an open-access fishery, benefits tend to  be dissipated because whenever a 
positive benefit occurs (as in a newly developing fishery or with an increase in the price 
for the product),  additional factor inputs of  labor and capital are attracted. This tends to 
continue  until revenue per unit of  fishing effort is equated to the level of  its marginal 
opportunity  cost (Scott  1955; Copes  1972; Munro and Chee  1978; Christy  1982). The 
exploitation  of  fishery  resources under open-access conditions, as such, will result in a 
suboptimal allocation of  resources as far as  strict economic efficiency is concerned. This 
was established in the seminal work on fisheries economics by Gordon (1954), by 
introducing economic variables into the logistic model of population growth in fisheries 
of  Schaefer  (1954). 
Uncontrolled access to fishing stocks induces fishers to compete among themselves 
for available fish resources. As  a result, there is little incentive for  individual fishers to 
restrict their fishing effort in the general  interest of  maintaining fish stocks since any 
fish that an individual fisher leaves in the water  may be captured by another fisher. 
This situation results in dissipation of  the economic rent that  resources can generate, 
through overcapitalization  and overfishing. As  such, we find the industry characterized 
by production costs that are excessive relative to the value of  production.  Fishers, 
therefore,  eventually find themselves in an untenable position with considerable 
investment in vessels and equipment that cannot be instantly liquidated (Cauvin  1979). 
In  small-scale fisheries of  developing countries, investments are not as great as in 
large-scale fisheries,  but the results are the same as there are few employment 
opportunities  consistent with their skills and experience. 
Second,  as a result of  excessive fishing effort, and despite harvest control 
measures, fisheries resources are subject to  overexploitation (Scott  1979). Finally, the 
potential economic value of  the resource to society  in the form of  a resource rent 
becomes dissipated (Cauvin  1979). This is a classic case of the "Tragedy of  the 
Commons" (Hardin  1968). 
Various forms of  externalities result from open competition in the harvesting sector 
of  the fishery.  They include: (i) crowding externalities due to vessel congestion on 
fishing grounds; (ii) misallocation of  effort among species and fishing grounds; and (iii) 
distortion in the  use of  factors of  production, e.g.,  incentive to adopt new technologies 
faster than is socially desirable (Greboval 1985). 
Management Alternatives 
The  literature on fisheries economics divides fisheries  regulations into two broad 
categories:  conservation  measures to protect and enhance stock productivity  and 
management measures aimed at  economic efficiency. 
Conservation measures such as closed season or  area and control  of  mesh size 
have received considerable attention by fisheries regulatory authorities.  For instance, 
following  the conceptualization  of  eumetric fishing by Beverton and Holt (1957), the 
control of  mesh size became a very popular regulatory instrument. The consequence of 
eumetric fishing is to  increase the yield and biomass; the latter being important if FOREWORD 
The present document is based on a thesis in resource economics presented at the 
Faculty of Economics and Management, Universiti Pertanian Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, in 
July 1989. 
In the course of his thesis work, Dr. M. Ahmed spent, besides the obligatory field work in 
Bangladesh, his homeland, a period of almost three years at ICLARM Headquarters in 
Manila from 1986 to 1988, both to learn from and contribute to various projects related to 
his work, and conducted by other ICLARM staff, notably Dr. M. Agiiero and Ms. A. Cruz- 
Trinidad. 
It is now with considerable pleasure that I introduce this document - our first Technical 
Report devoted to Bangladesh - to its readers. It illustrates - if need be - that economists 
have much to contribute to fisheries research and management. Indeed, such a 
comprehensive view of the freshwater fisheries of Bangladesh as presented in this 
document has never been elaborated by the biologists - local and expatriate - who have 
studied the inland fisheries of Bangladesh: the biologists have tended to concentrate on 
details of the biology of the resources species and to forget the "big picture". 
This big picture, as presented to us by Dr. Ahmed, is that the fisheries in question are 
extremely valuable and could generate, under the optimal conditions he identifies, a net 
surplus of nearly 1.4 billion Taka, i.e., over US$40 million per year. He also identifies and 
quantifies the main constraint to the realization of this surplus: excess fishing effort, the 
plague of the world of fishing. 
Finally, he presents a cogent case for the implementation of the New Management 
Policy promulgated by the Government of Bangladesh, as well as providing guidelines for 
further studies. 
I can only hope that this document will find, among decisionmakers and scientists alike 
in Bangladesh and elsewhere, an attentive readership. Comprehensive studies such as that 
presented here are few and far between. 
Dr. DANIEL PAULY 
Director 
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ABSTRACT 
An operational model was derived which can be used to analyze the performance of 
Bangladesh riverine fisheries under different simulated alternatives of  technical, economic and 
biological conditions. 
Functions and parameters of  a Base Model were estimated by deriving two submodels: (a) 
bioeconomic production and (b) the market, using regression techniques. Both primary and 
secondary data were used for empirical estimation of the submodels. 
The model was developed in a linear programming framework to represent various fisheries in 
the riverine waters of  Bangladesh. Results of the Base Model suggest that the riverine fisheries 
of  Bangladesh are capable, under optimal conditions, of  generating a total net benefit of  BDT 
(Bangladesh Taka)  1,383 million per annum (US$1 = BDT32), of  which 96% would accrue as 
producer surplus. Also, a significant overcapacity (118%) exists in the existing fleet in terms of 
application of  effort relative to the resource availability. 
Simulation of  cost and demand changes reveal that the effect of  changes in the cost 
condition of  harvest will in general be related negatively to the intensity of total effort use, total 
landings, benefits and costs while the effects of  changes in the aggregate demand on total effort, 
total costs, landings, prices and net benefits will be positive. The implication of  the results for 
management is that  intervention into the fisheries through control on effort intensity would produce 
substantial net benefits from the fisheries. Hilsa, the major 
Bangladesh. 
riverine species in 
Fishing operation using seine net in Buringonga river 
near Dhaka, Bangladesh. 
Local fish market in Manikgonj near Dhaka, Bangladesh. 
Aspects 






by M. Ahmed) 
Hook and line fishing in Jamuna River, near Aricha, 
Bangladesh. 
Fish landing site  along a  river  in northeastern 
Bangladesh. 
Intensive  fishing  operations  in  floodlands  near  Myrnensingh, 
Bangladesh. recruitment  is stock dependent.  However, in an open-access fishery, the rent created by 
eumetric fishing will only induce additional entry and the basic problem of economic 
inefficiency will persist (Turvey  1964). Therefore, these traditional forms of  control may 
help protect stocks from  destructive  forms of  effort,  but are ineffective in regulating the 
amount  of  effort.  In fact, severe overcapitalization  occurred in some world fisheries as a 
consequence  of  measures such as catch quotas or  closed seasons or  areas 
(Crutchfield 1965; Greboval 1985). In addition,  these  measures (catch quota, season 
and area closure)  affect the  processing and marketing sector of  the fishery  by inducing 
peak and slack processing times,  increased inventories and freezing,  and price 
distortions (Anderson 1977). Thus,  economists  have tended to rely on  management 
measures that reduce total  inputs (effort) for  any given catch level and encourage least- 
cost combination of  inputs. Such measures include taxes,  limited entry and quotas. 
Theoretically, with an appropriate tax,  fisheries  could be left to  the  market without 
fear  of  biological depletion,  of  excessive inputs in general,  or of  the incorrect 
combination of  inputs (Crutchfield  1979). Either inputs (effort) or output  (landings) may 
be taxed. However, in order to produce its fullest  effect, taxes must be factor-neutral 
(Crutchfield 1979). In this  respect, a tax  on landings makes a better impact.  In addition, 
McConnell and Norton (1978) suggest that differential  landing taxes  in a mixed-species 
fishery could improve economic output significantly  by making use of  the fishers' self- 
interest and their  limited ability to alter the species  mix in their  catch. 
Finally, taxes  serve as means of  offsetting any adverse effects on the distribution of 
wealth, income or  employment; taxes could be used to  convert the social costs  of 
management to  an explicit  charge on the productive activity  of  the participants. 
There are, however,  at  least two practical difficulties with using taxes.  First, they are 
politically infeasible in most parts of the world.  Second,  if taxes were used they would 
have to be dynamic,  changing frequently,  causing enormous administrative difficulties 
(Moloney and Pearse  1979). 
Entry restriction reduces fishing inputs directly,  by restricting fishing to holders of  a 
legal right of  access  -  a license, permit, or other legal evidence that a particular vessel 
and crew  may use the  resource.  However, entry restrictions  must be in terms of a  limit 
upon one or  more of  the  measures used in the  industry. This is because rationing the 
supply  of  any  resource used in the  industry through  entry restrictions will invite 
substitution  of other  resources for  it (Turvey  1964). 
Experiences with  limited entry programs in many fisheries  across the world have 
proven to  be ineffective because some of  the  unregulated dimension of  the fishing 
effort expanded to such an extent that substantial  overcapitalization  (capital stuffing) 
had occurred and much of  the potential rents were eventually dissipated (Fraser  1979; 
Meany 1979; Pearse and Wilen  1979; Copes and Cook  1982). 
There  are exceptions.  Newton (1978) acknowledged the growth of excess capital 
under limited entry in  British Columbia fisheries with qualifications.  Also,  Meany (1979) 
citing the cases of  rock lobster and shrimp fisheries  of  Australia under limited entry 
programs showed that there  has been less tendency  of  overcapitalization  and,  hence, 
little dissipation  of  resource rent in shrimp fisheries  compared to lobster fisheries. 
In tropical  multispecies fisheries,  limited entry programs by license limitations and 
vessel and gear  restrictions have been used to restrict catch level and to  change  catch 
compositions  in order to prevent overexploitation  (Beddington and Rettig 1983; Majid 
1984). Although the  success of  such measures have not been fully  assessed, Yahaya 
(1988) in discussing the  issues and constraints of  fishery  management and regulation  in 
Peninsular Malaysia,  pointed out that  license limitation  may also  lead to  operating 
inefficiency among licensed vessels through  increase of  unregulated dimension of  effort. The third alternative  in regulating exploitation intensity would be to create rights to 
specific quantities of  fish (individual quotas) rather than simple rights to participate in 
the fishery through vessel or  personal license.  Under an  individual quota system there 
is no incentive to overinvest in the vessel and gear. This would avoid some of the 
regulatory problems encountered in limited entry licensing, the dilemma between 
restricting technology to check capital stuffing through socially inefficient increase in 
fishing  capacity and allowing free play to promote socially efficient cost reducing 
techniques. 
The quota holders will select the least cost combination and deployment of  inputs, 
including technological  improvement and innovation without subjecting the resource to a 
surge of  new fishing mortality (Crutchfield 1979). In addition, harvest glut can be 
avoided or  reduced and a higher value of  sales achieved by optimally meeting the time 
patterns of  demand over the year (Copes 1986). 
Despite the superiority  of  quotas, especially over limited entry licensing (see Christy 
1973; Moloney and Pearse  1979; Scott and Neher 1981), in practical management 
terms, deliberate application of  individual quotas are not seen free of defects. Copes 
(1986) gave  an exhaustive  list of  areas where individual quotas face problems of 
implementation.  Most of  them are relevant for tropical fisheries where the operations  are 
small scale with numerous actual and potential marketing channels and geographically 
widely dispersed activities. 
In the case of  inland fisheries  of  Bangladesh, thousands of small boats land their 
catches at  hundreds of  places and sell directly to the public at numerous local markets. 
Monitoring and enforcing any kind of  limits on inputs and outputs would appear 
impossible. However, a limited entry program through licensing may still conform to 
ease of  implementation and flexibility  compared to taxes and quotas. The fear of  capital 
stuffing through  overinvestment  in unregulated dimension of  effort would be minimal, 
since the fisheries are mainly traditional  and nonmechanized. 
Analysis of Existing Economic Models of Fisheries 
Fisheries are complex systems, consisting  not only of the stocks of fish species and 
their surrounding  environment, but also including the  mechanisms of  harvesting, 
processing, transporting  and marketing activities, as well as the social and institutional 
setup under which the economic organization of  the fishing industry takes place 
(Charles  1988). A  multidimensional  approach has to be adopted for capturing the 
essence of its various aspects, e.g.,  production, population dynamics, marketing and 
property systems. 
Certain types of  models, each used separately, could not suitably deal with the 
problem at hand.  Each of  them could only represent a part or subsystem, e.g., 
production,  fish population,  marketing and management, of  the entire fishery  process. 
Several approaches to  analyzing the  implications of  various  management schemes 
are  available.  Mathematical models of  the fishery which include biological and some 
economic factors  have been found to  be useful tools for determining the best regulatory 
scheme. Some familiar  examples of  these models are given by Schaefer (1954,  1968), 
Beverton and Holt (1957), Ricker (1  958), Larkin (1  963,  1966), Pella and Tomlinson 
(1969) and Fox (1970). 
However, the above models dealt  mostly with biological parameters and describe 
how fisheries  (often a single-species  fishery) change with time  under a steady-state 
situation, whereas,  in most cases fisheries operate under complex biotechnological  and socioeconomic conditions. The  inclusion of  these factors  in the analysis results in 
multivariable models which are complex. 
Much of the previous analysis of  fisheries is based on the concept of an equilibrium, 
e.g.,  the maximum equilibrium yield analysis.  Such an equilibrium is an idealization and 
is never encountered in reality because of  the continually changing environment which 
acts as a disturbance and thereby displaces the system from its equilibrium conditions 
(Palm 1975). Moreover, the steady-state models may lose their applicability in complex 
fisheries when the time dimension is considered. 
Unlike biological fishery management models,  most of  the fisheries economics 
models dealing with management problems were cast largely in static terms,  based on 
a theory  of fisheries  management founded by Gordon (Clark and Munro  1975). Scott 
(1955) viewed fish  population and biomass as  a capital stock, capable of yielding a 
sustainable  consumption flow  through time,  and thus attempted to cast the problem of 
management of  a fishery resource as a problem in capital theory. This was  followed by 
Crutchfield and Zellner's  (1962) formulation in terms of  a dynamic mathematical 
problem. 
Optimization techniques, to maximize or  minimize a particular function,  may involve 
either linear or quadratic programming. Zellner  (1961),  Rothschild and Balsiger (1  971), 
Mueller et al.  (1979) and Aguero  (1987) applied linear programming to the economics of 
fisheries  management. Mueller and Vidaeus (1981) developed a quadratic programming 
model for an optimal fishery  strategy. The problem can be set either in a static or a 
dynamic frame. A simple dynamic approach was  used by Rothschild (1971), who 
optimized the route of  a fishing vessel.  Quirk and Smith (1970) applied a time dynamic 
programming model to economic optimization of  a fishing industry. Booth (1972) 
developed a discrete time-profit maximizing model.  More recently, Wang and Mueller 
(1981) developed a model that deals with  intertemporal issues and economic analysis in 
fisheries  management.  Palm (1975)  showed the use of  a static optimization method in 
conjunction with  a dynamic method as a total approach.  In this method,  maximization is 
first done with static methods and then a feedback control function is constructed to 
keep the system  near the resulting equilibrium condition. 
In selecting  models, several considerations have to be made.  For instance,  if the 
multispecies fishery characteristics call for an interactive approach, analytical models are 
more appropriate  than single-species production models based on catch and effort data 
derived for  a multispecies fishery (Greboval 1985). Another  consideration is the data 
requirement of analysis.  For example,  in multiple strategy fishing, the catchability 
coefficient  (fraction of  stock removed by a unit of  effort) can be better estimated using 
cluster analysis.  However, the need for  intensive data renders the use of  such methods 
impracticable (Greboval  1985). 
Technologocial  interaction and mixed harvest strategy would yield an optimal harvest 
rate for the aggregate of  stocks different from the theoretical maximum of  each  ,+ 
individual stock.  However, if economic yield is maximized by equating marginal cost of 
fishing effort to the  marginal revenues of  a mixed catch,  an optimal mix of  production is 
achieved. Proper bioeconomic management of  multispecies fisheries, therefore,  requires 
control of  overall amount of  effort and some degree of  control over the  mix of 
production. An  interactive method can be applied to achieve such objectives. 
Optimization techniques  have been used for economic optimization of mixed stocks by 
several authors, e.g.,  Quirk and Smith (1970), Anderson (1975), Meuriot (1981), Aguero 
(1  983) and Logan (1984). Conclusion 
The situation in Bangladesh warrants developing or  devising methods that will take 
proper account of  the problem of  poor quality data and the complex interaction of 
various factors,  e.g,,  technological  interaction and mixed species harvest. It is important 
that the fishery  process be represented by a model that  is flexible and powerful enough 
to  accommodate data and information gaps.  A  mathematical programming approach is 
considered appropriate and suitable because: 
(i)  it can handle a large number of variables of  complex interdependence; 
(ii)  the objective function  (e.g.,  maximization of  consumer plus producer surplus) can 
measure the achievement of  management objectives; and 
(iii)  the  model is capable of  identifying an optimal strategy for allocation of  effort in a 
mixed-species harvest with geographical and seasonal variability  in the species 
distribution. CHAPTER  2 
INLAND FISHERIES OF BANGLADESH 
Bangladesh  is a huge delta of  144,000 km2  formed by three  main  rivers: the  Padma 
(Ganges), Meghna and Jamuna-Brahmaputra and their tributaries  (Fig. 2.1). The size of 
the  riverine  (flowing river and estuaries) and other  large inland perennial water  bodies 
has been estimated to  be about  12,200 km2, i.e.,  over  8OlO of  the  area of  Bangladesh 
(Table 33  in Appendix  A). The major 
fisheries  take place  in: (a) rivers and 
estuaries,  (b) beels (natural depressions) 
and baors (dead rivers), (c) floodlands 
(seasonal floodplains)  and (d) an artificial 
lake  (Kaptai Lake). 
The Production System 
The  inland capture fisheries are tightly 
bound to  the pattern of  the floodings which 
take  place during the  monsoon season. 
The yearly  inundation of  the  countryside 
connects  all the  aquatic  areas into one 
production system for  up to  four  months 
(July-October). It is during this season that 
a major expansion  in both numbers and 
biomass of fish takes place. Some of  the 
major carps  (Cyprinidae) and various 
floodland-dependent species  spawn then 
and the  fry spread all  over the  flooded 
area during this  period. The  ability  of  the 
fisheries  to  sustain themselves  depends on 
extensive systems of interconnected areas 
of  aquatic  habitat that provide for 
reproduction and growth. 
Estimates of  the  annual fish  production 
from  various  water  environments and area 
under each environment  are shown  in 
Table 2.1; a total  of  424,140 t of  fish were 
produced in 1988-89 from four  million 
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Fig. 2.1. Map of Bangladesh: river systems and geographic 
regions. 
hectares of inland open-water area.  Moreover, the  area of  land intermittently  inundated 
during the  monsoon season to  a depth of  30 cm or  more (sufficient to  support fish 
production) is estimated to  be about 5.5  million ha (MPOIHARZA  1985b). Hilsa (Hilsa 
ilisha), carps  (e.g., rohu Labeo rohita, catla Catla catla, mrigal  Cirrhinus mrigala and 
kalbasu Labeo calbasu) and a few floodland-dependent species  like catfish (e.g., "boal" 
Wallago attu, "pangas"  Pangasius pangasius, "air" Mystus aor) and different types of 
prawns (Macrobrachiurn spp.)  are the  important species in the  inland open waters. The Table 2.1. Areas of  different types of fisheries and annual production in Bangladesh, 1988-89. 
(Source: DOF, unpubl. data) 
Area  Production  Yield 
Subsector of fisheries  (ha.1o3)  (t.10~)  YO  (kg.hal) 
Inland fisheries 
Open waterlcapture 

















major harvest periods of  some  economically  important fish of  Bangladesh are presented 
in Fig. 2.2.  In general, except for hilsa, harvests from rivers take place in the 
postmonsoon period. The peak harvest of  hilsa is during the spawning migration in the 
late monsoon period (August-October).  A list of  important fish is contained in 
Appendix  C. 
The  annual or  seasonal beels, which either dry up or  are dried intentionally, are 
completely  harvested each year during postmonsoon months. The  permanent beel is a 
shelter fishery,  and under the current management  system,  harvest is recommended 
only every third year to allow the fish  populations to recover. 
Harvest of  the floodlands fish  is done mainly for  subsistence throughout the 
monsoon months (June through September). The peak harvest generally occurs during 
periods of  receding or rising water when fish are trapped while coming to or going from 
the floodlands. The annual fish  harvest from the floodlands through subsistence fishing 
has been estimated at  186,130 t in 1988-89  (Table 2.1),  and as  many as  10.8 million 
(73%) households were  involved in these fishing activities in 1987-88 (World Bank 
1991). 
On the other  hand, riverine fisheries  are important for small-scale commercial fishing 
year-round.  The total area of  river environments scattered all over the country is 10,316 
km2 producing about  181,140 t of  fish annually (Table 2.1). Table 2.2  shows the 
production figures for different species in the riverine waters (rivers and estuaries). Hilsa 
is the dominant species, amounting to about 44%  of  the average annual riverine fish 
production  (Table 2.2). 
Major Inland  Fisheries 
HILSA  FISHERY 
The  hilsa, an anadromous  fish  (i.e.,  migrating from  the sea into rivers to spawn),  is 
found in the foreshore areas,  estuaries, brackishwater lakes and freshwater  rivers of Jan  Feb  Mar  Apr  May / ~un  /  Jul  j  Aug ; Sep j  Oct  i Nov  Dec 
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Fig.  2.2. Seasonal changes  in  the 
biology  and  fisheries  of  fish  and 
prawns  in  the  open  waters  of 
Bangladesh (Source: MPOIHARZA 
1985a). 
South and West Asia.  The  largest yields of  hilsa fishery  come from the deltaic region of 
the  Gangetic system of  India and Bangladesh. Of the three countries in the  upper Bay 
of  Bengal region (India, Bangladesh and Burma), where  hilsa forms  a commercial 
fishery,  Bangladesh secures the largest share (more than  80%) of  the landings, about 
150,000 tyear-I from  its inland river systems and inshore waters (Raja 1985; Islam 
1989). In Bangladesh, the share of  riverine production is at present less than 50% of 
the  national production of  hilsa (World Bank 1991). 
No scientific  assessment has been made so far on the population distribution  of  the 
various stocks of  hilsa in the rivers, estuaries and inshore marine waters of  Bangladesh 
(Dunn 1982). However, the dominant age and size in the population distribution  is 
believed to be 1+ to 2+ years  and 25-40 cm,  respectively (Raja 1985). Normally, hilsa 
attains maturity at the age  of I+  year when  it has reached a size of  25-30 cm. Two 
principal breeding runs have been reported in Bangladesh, one during the  southwest 
monsoon (June-October) and the other during winter  (November-March). The latter is of 
smaller magnitude (Raja 1985). 
The fishing season of  riverine and estuarine stocks extends from June to  March, 
with a major  peak in September-October and a minor one in February-March. In 1988- 
89, over  81,000  t of  hilsa were harvested from various inland rivers and estuaries, 68% 
of  which came from the principal river,  Meghna (Table 2.2).  The fishery  belongs  to the 
artisanal sector  using mainly gillldriftnets  and operates with the help of  traditional Table 2.2.  Recent annual catches (t) of various species from the rivers of Bangladesh. (Source: 
DOFIBFRSS 1985,  1986;  DOF, unpubl. data). 
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83-84  9,741 
84-85  10,384 
85-86  14,489 
86-87  15,988 
87-88  17,417 
88-89  11,330 
Average  13,225 
All species 
83-84  70,799 
84-85  52,887 
85-86  85,364 
86-87  81,789 
87-88  68,485 
88-89  69,846 
Average  71,528 
nonmechanized plank built, undecked or  partly decked boats. Melvin (1984) reported 
that  a large expansion in effort has taken place in this fishery over the years and a 
large increase in effort has provided only marginal increase in landings in recent times. CARP  FISHERY 
The  carp fishery  is important in the principal rivers Padma, Jamuna and 
Brahmaputra and the beels and basins of  Faridpur, Rajshahi and Sylhet-Mymensingh. 
The  populations of  major carps in various  parts of  the  Padma-Meghna-Brahmaputra 
river  system come from three  main stocks: the Brahmaputra stock, Padma stock  and 
Meghna stock  (Tsai and Ali  1985).  In their early life (up to 3+ years of age), the carps 
prefer to  reside in the beels, basins and floodlands. After  they  become sexually  mature 
at the  age  of  3+ years, they become permanent riverine residents. During their first 
three years of  life, they aisperse amongst the inundated basins in the flooding season 
and resettle randomly in beels, rivers and baors as the water  level subsides during the 
dry season (Tsai and Ali  1985). The spawning migration of  carps toward  (upstream) 
rivers occurs in February-June. Spawning continues until August.  Young  carps disperse 
over the floodlands  during the monsoon months (June-October).  From September until 
November, when the water level starts subsiding in the dry season, the young carps 
return to the beels and rivers.  Harvest of  carps in beels and rivers takes place mostly 
in dry season (January-April); the peak fishery occurs between February and March. 
Carps are also  harvested during the spawning migration between February and June. 
Studies on carp populations have shown that the population structure differs in 
different beels and river  habitats,  particularly across different geographical  locations. 
These differences  could be due to the differences  in the origin  of the stock and the 
size, depth and physical structure of  the various river and bee1 habitats.  However, the 
important factors that cause significant differences  in the population structure, 
particularly  age structure, are the effectiveness of  gear used and the intensity of  fishing. 
For instance, intensive use of  katta (fish aggregating device) fishing in beels in Faridpur 
and drift gillnet  (fasi  jal and pait jal)  fishing  in the  Padma River might have caused a 
decline  of  the stock of  young carp over one year old in these areas.  At  present about 
6,200  t of  various carp species are harvested annually from  rivers (Table 2.2).  The size 
of  the carp harvest from other environments (e.g.,  beels, floodlands  and baors) is more 
than  10,000 t (World Bank 1991). In pond culture, carp is considered one of  the 
preferred species, which  is supported by a fry gathering  industry in the  rivers (Tsai and 
Ali  1985). 
A wide variety of  gear  is used for carp fishing.  In the riverine fishery,  katta fishing 
and jal (net) fishing are important. Katta fishing operates in the secondary rivers and 
associated canals.  Drift gillnet, fixed gillnet, dragnet and castnet are extensively used 
for carp fishing in the rivers.  In "beel" fisheries,  small beels are harvested through 
dewatering.  For large seasonal beels and permanent beels,  katta,  castnet,  dragnet and 
mosquito netting seine are the  important gears (Tsai and Ali  1985). 
GIANT  FRESHWATER PRAWN 
The  rivers Padma and Meghna are important sources of  giant freshwater prawns 
(Macrobrachiurn spp.). The adult prawns migrate toward estuarine waters for spawning 
during February-April. Spawning in estuarine water takes place between April and June. 
The juvenile  prawns migrate toward freshwater  during the monsoon rains  (June- 
September)  and disperse  into the floodlands for feeding and growth.  Harvest of 
freshwater  prawns in the rivers takes place from September  until March (when adult 
prawns migrate toward estuaries for spawning)  (Goodwin and Hanson 1974). A variety 
of  gear is used to harvest prawns.  Important are the dragnet, seine, fixed pursenet, 
stakenet, dipnet and castnet. 
In terms of  total landings, freshwater  prawns constitute the second largest fishery 
after hilsa in the  rivers. Total average landings of  prawns from the rivers are 20,895 tyear-'(Table 2.2). However, a declining trend  in the proportion of  large individuals in 
the  total  catch of  freshwater  prawns from the rivers has been observed in recent times 
(DOF, unpubl. data). 
FLOODLAND-DEPENDENT SPECIES 
A number of  fish  are captured from the open-water fishery. A majority of these 
species depend on floodlands  for their spawning and early life. Lateral migration  of 
these species  toward the  floodlands  takes place during April-August  and reproduction 
occurs between May and September. Throughout  the flooding season they disperse into 
the  floodlands and grow fast. As soon as the  monsoon waters start receding, these 
fishes  return to the small rivers and/or to beels and reside there during the whole  dry 
season.  Harvesting takes place from  May until December, with a peak occurring 
between October  and December. The gears used for  harvesting these species  are 
numerous as they are spread in different types of  open-water  environments. Appendix 
C  contains  a list of the  most important among these species. 
Some of the  catfishes  (e.g., pangas, boa1 and air) constitute  a major fishery  in the 
rivers. The total  catch of  catfish in 1984-85 was  6% (12,500  t) of  the total riverine 
harvest.  However, the species have been showing a declining trend. 
Finally, a feature that characterizes the fisheries  in the  rivers are the geographical 
and seasonal variability  of  species  composition  in the total  harvest. Table 2.3  shows the 
percentage composition of  annual landings from the rivers in the three  geographic 
regions. As  an example,  nearly 90% of  the  hilsa and 60% of  the  total  riverine  landings 
come from the  Lower Meghna and other smaller  rivers in the southwest  region (Region 
Table 2.3. Percentage share of annual landings of different species from rivers in different 
regions of Bangladesh (1983-87). (Source: DOF, unpubl. data). 
Region  Hilsa  Carp  Catfish  Prawn  Misc.  Total 
Region A  9  74  42  62  55  34 
Region B  89  8  36  36  3 1  59 
Region C  2  18  22  2  14  7 
Total  100  100  100  100  100  100 
Region A: Southeast and northeast region (Upper  Meghna river and other  rivers in the 
region); Region B: Southwest region (Lower Meghna, Lower Padma and rivers in the region); 
Region C: Northwest region (Upper Padma, Jamuna-Brahmaputra and other rivers in the 
region). 
B) of  Bangladesh. Table 2.4 shows the  composition  of  annual landings by season  (wet 
and dry). It shows that  73% of  hilsa and 60% of  total  catch are  landed during the wet 
season. This feature  is reflective of  varying species abundance  among different  fishing 
grounds and seasons. This  is also  evident from  Fig. 2.3,  which  shows the distribution of 
catch by species  and by river. 
Production Organization and Dynamics of Fleet Operations 
Activities  in inland open-water fisheries  can be divided  into three  major parts: 
harvesting, postharvesting handling (processing, transporting,  storing and marketing) and 
retail selling. Of these,  harvesting is the most critical,  involving the  interaction of 
biotechnology and economic factors. Table 2.4. Seasonal share (%) of landings of different species from rivers in each region of 
Bangladesh, 1983-87.  (Source: DOF, unpubl. data). 

















Region A:  Southeast and northeast region (Upper Meghna river and other rivers in the region); 
Region 6: Southwest region (Lower Meghna, Lower Padma and rivers in the region); Region 
C: Northwest region (Upper Padma, Jamuna-Brahmaputra and other rivers in the region). 
Harvesting activities  are organized by traditional  fishers from the poor and landless 
population. The primary level of  the  harvesting organization  is a fishing unit. A  unit 
consists of a group of  two  to  fifteen  fishers depending on the size and type  of  boat 
and gear. 
Fishing in the  rivers requires a substantial investment  in vessel and gear, which the 
majority of  fishers  cannot afford. Generally, a few  rich fishers  and middlemen traders 
own these inputs. The other fishers  either  rent these  inputs for fishing purposes or join 
as a crew  member on  a catch sharing basis. The distributional mechanism of  catch 
among boat and gear owners and labor fishers varies  among fisheries  and fishing 
grounds.  In general, 50% of  the net revenue (total sales  minus operating expenses)  is 
taken  by the  boat and gear owner(s), called the  proprietor or  malik, and the  remaining 
50% is shared among the  crew  members according to their  roles and skills (Khaled 
1985; Ullah  1985). 
The fleet  is heterogeneous with  respect to  boats and gear. Table 2.5 shows the 
distribution of  annual landings of  different species of  fish  by type  of  gear.  As  high as 
94% of  hilsa and 52% of  the total landings are caught  by gillnet and 42% of  the 
operating units are gillnetters.  Statistics on the  distribution of  gear  by species  are not 
available. However, individual fishing units normally direct their  efforts toward target 
species. The  catch includes a significant  by-catch (i.e.,  nontarget species). Since the 
abundance  of  species varies across seasons, the  fleet dynamics also  allow individual 
fishing units to  change their target species between seasons. 
Demand Relations and Markets 
Fish are transported from  the  fishing grounds to the principal landing centers and 
wholesale  markets through various  market intermediaries and middlemen dealers,  e.g., 9or  A :  ~y  species 
oA  80r  6:  ~y  river groups 
"  " 
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Fig. 2.3. Percentage composition of average yearly catch in the rivers of Bangladesh, 1983-84 to 1988-89 
Table 2.5. Distribution of annual catch (t) from the rivers of Bangladesh by type of gear, 1985- 
86. (Source: DOFIBFRSS 1985, 1986; DOF, unpubl. data). 
Other 
Species  Gillnet  Seine  Clapnet  Liftnet  Selnet  Castnet  nets  Total 
NO.  Of 
fishing 
units  ,5,444  1.329  8,619  2.630  5,323  2,184  1,553  37.101 
(W  (42)  (4)  (23)  (7)  (14)  (6)  (4)  (1  00) 
assemblers, commission agents (aratdars) and local traders.  Fig. 2.4 shows the  main 
marketing channels of  fresh fish harvested from open waters of  Bangladesh. 
Transportation takes place by water,  rail and road.  In urban areas, fish  are distributed 
by headload, push cart and rickshaw (FAOIRapport 1986). 
Generally, fish reach the domestic consumers in the form in which they  are captured 
or  harvested,  without  processing.  However, preservation techniques  of  freezing,  icing, 
salting and drying are used to move products to distant markets. 
Except for  giant freshwater  prawns taken for export,  all fish from the inland open 
waters are consumed locally. Domestic fish prices at the ex-vessel landing centers and 
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Fig. 2.4. Main marketing channels of fresh fish from the riverine fisheries 
of Bangladesh. 
forces.  However, since fishing is still a  hunting activity, periods of  glut and scarcity 
alternate. These influence market supply  in the short run.  In the  medium run, 
seasonality is the  influencing factor.  Accordingly,  the trend is for price to  be lower in 
the dry season (November-February) when beels are intensively fished;  higher in the 
early wet season (March-May) when there are less fish in the  rivers; and moderate in 
the  later part of the wet season (June-September) when monsoon rain introduces 
extensive floodlands fisheries  (~ig.  2.5). 
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Fig. 2.5. Monthly average retail prices of major riverine species in  Bangladesh, showing 
seasonal trends and overall price increases over time. Management and Tenure: Their Implications 
Following the provisions for settlement of  land and waters under British rule 
(Permanent Settlement of  1793), fisheries  in Bangladesh were classified as either 
"proprietary fishing" or public right of  fishing.  Proprietary fishing was characterized by an 
exclusive  right to  fish (or to allow fishing), whereas the public right of  fishing was 
characterized by open access with common rights of  fishing. With the commencement 
of the  East Bengal Estate Acquisition and Tenancy Act of  1951, both common property 
rights as well as the private property rights in the fisheries of  Bangladesh were 
substantially abridged by the government. The government possesses the rights of 
exclusion  or  the  right to set the conditions and terms of  access to the fishery  resource 
or  its services.  Other than the privately owned freshwater ponds and some 
brackishwater areas, all the inland water areas are, in fact, state property, held under 
the jurisdiction  of different government agencies. There are three broad categories of 
public water  bodies and of  the fisheries they  support, each having a separate system of 
administration  and control: (i) open fisheries; (ii) closed fisheries; and (iii) reservoir 
fisheries. The  management mechanism in the open fisheries and its implications for 
exploitation  pattern and income generating potentials are discussed below. 
Open fisheries consist of  rivers and canals, beels, baors and lakes linked to the 
river system.  These are divided into units of  variable sizes and shapes,  leased out to 
individuals  or groups of  individuals (e.g.,  cooperatives) on an annual basis, except in 
certain cases where three-year leases are allowed. The  leaseholders collect tolls from 
fishers depending on the type and size of  boats used for fishing. The type of  toll  is 
also different in different open-water environments.  In some areas, the toll is a fixed 
amount  (e.g.,  in Meghna River) while in other areas (e.g.,  Jamuna River, Kaptai Lake), 
it is a percentage of total fish output.  In some cases, the proportion of  toll ranges up to 
one-third of the gross catch (Ullah 1985). The  leaseholder keeps a big group of 
employees who  help in the collection of tolls as well as in the administration of  the 
leasehold. 
In some permanent beels, which are considered as closed fisheries, a three-year 
leasing system  is followed. These types of  bee1 are concentrated in the Sylhet- 
Mymensingh basin in the northeast and Faridpur basin in the southwest. 
Aside from these, there are small fisheries which are either free (water bodies 
reserved to support worship of  Hindu deities) or  held at a fixed rent in perpetuity (which 
were  previously owned by private owners before the East Bengal Estate Acquisition  and 
Tenancy  Act  1951 came into effect). The government earns no revenue from these 
types of  fisheries. 
In principle, the  leasing policy for fishing rights ascribes to  sustainable productivity of 
the fisheries,  raising government revenue and spreading the benefits to  more 
disadvantaged segments of  the population. Such aims of  the government were 
manifested in its attempt to amend the leasing procedure to  include provision of 
preferences to  fishers,  strict adherence to  fishing regulations and raising the  lease-value 
from time to time. 
While fishing regulations (Fish Act  1950) are incorporated in the lease agreement in 
an  effort to sustain  productivity, in practice the lessee is seldom constrained by them. 
In fact,  anybody engaged in fishing in a particular  leasehold can retain access into the 
fishery  as  long as the leaseholder is paid the toll or tax  from time to time. Therefore,  in 
the absence of  explicit adherence to the minimal regulatory measures, the open-water 
capture fisheries  of  Bangladesh retain an  unrestricted free-access nature. (The term free-access (Weitzman  1974), open-access  (Clark 1976) and free  entry (Hartwick 1982) 
are all  used to describe the same phenomenon). 
Although  access  rights are privatized by the  highest bidder in the  leasing process 
and thus water  bodies become a sole ownership property, theoretically  an efficient way 
to  manage the  resources  (Copes 1972; Clark and Munro  1980), the  specific procedures 
and conditions under which the  leasing mechanism operates turn  resources eventually 
to  open access.  Periodicity of  leasing (usually one year) with  no assured renewal gives 
a low degree  of  security of  tenure. As  such,  the  lease holders set a revenue-oriented 
objective  in the  management and organization  of  harvesting activities during the period 
of  lease tenure.  Often, this  induces lessors to seek the largest possible aggregate 
fishing toll by encouraging entry of  as many possible fishers  into the  fishery (Aguero 
and Ahmed  1990). All  of  these  imply that no individual, collectivity,  or planner is able to 
control the rate of  exploitation  of  the  fish stocks. Access  or entry to  the stock is 
virtually  free or  open. The  stock is exploited  (or  is exploitable) by all fishers. 
It is feared that there  has been an enormous decline  in the  inland fishery (especially 
hilsa and carp)  resulting from overfishing  (Raja 1985; Tsai and Ali  1985). As seen from 
Fig. 2.6, the total inland catch of  fish dropped by more than 25% in  1975-76. However, 
the fishing dependent population has been steadily  increasing over time.  Indeed, the 
total  catch over the  years  is more or less stable,  except for the  sudden drop in 1975- 
76. One  might suspect such a fluctuation could have occurred due to  some adjustment 
in the statistical recording procedure after  1974-75. Another  possible  reason could be 
the  loss of  capital assets, e.g.,  gear  and boat during the famine  of  1974, implying a 
substantial loss of  fishing  power which  could not be replaced in the subsequent years. 
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Fig. 2.6. Capture of fish and number of fishers in the riverine fisheries of Bangladesh. 
In any case, given the  lack of  information and a weak and inconsistent database, it 
is hard to  quantify  biological overfishing. 
Nevertheless,  the situation is alarming on economic grounds. The free  entry situation 
in the  fisheries  continues to cause an increase in the  fishing dependent population 
even though the  industry is operating at very  low rates of  return, due to  the low 
opportunity  cost of  labor and the  high unemployment  and population growth rates. Fundamental Relationships 
The economic component in the biological production of  a fishery is the fishing effort 
and its associated cost. This was first pointed out by Gordon (1954). Conversion of 
cost of  effort  into cost of  output gives the traditional supply relationship in the product 
market. Copes (1970) incorporated the Schaefer-type sustainable yield curve in the cost 
of  output relations. This  is  represented in Fig. 3.1. 
The  long-run yield function  (biological production) for a fishery can be exhibited in 
terms of  the sustainable yield curve (SYC) shown in quadrant  IV of Fig. 3.1,  derivable 
from  Schaefer-type logistic growth of  stocks, which is assumed to  be a function of  its 
biomass (Schaefer  1954,  1957; Anderson  1977). 
The  curve in quadrant  IV of  Fig. 3.1  shows the  relationship between catch and 
effort.  It shows that successive units of  catch would require a higher amount of  effort. 
In other words, catch per unit of  effort decreases with the  increase in the  level of  effort. 
Moreover, once the  maximum sustainable yield level (MSY) is reached, subsequent 
increase in effort will  reduce the total catch that can be obtained on  a sustainable 
basis. 
In physical terms, each  unit of  effort can be said to  be composed of  a combination 
of standard size of  labor, vessel, gear and other production inputs per unit of  time. The 
market price of  these inputs constitutes the cost of  effort.  Under perfect competition this 
market price represents the opportunity cost of effort. Since each unit of  effort is 
capable of  catching a certain  amount of  fish, the cost of  a particular  unit of  effort is 
equivalent to  the  cost of producing the  corresponding amount of  fish.  If  cost per unit of 
physical inputs (effort) is constant, a decreasing catch per unit of  effort as shown by 
the  SYC would imply an  increasing cost per unit of  catch. This relationship is shown in 
quadrant  I of  Fig. 3.1, where the long-run average cost curve for fish harvesting wiil 
slope upward and bend backward beyond the  MSY, shown in quadrant  IV. 
If  there are other costs per unit of  fish produced at the processing, storing and 
transporting stages before it is sold to the consumers in final product form,  the  average 
cost curves can be moved up proportionately to include those dimensions of  costs. The 
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Fig. 3.1. Fundamental relationship  between  catch, effort and cost in  a fishery. Explanation 
in text. costs  involved at  the  postharvest levels can be considered  as  margins in the  marketing 
chain,  and under perfect competition they represent the  opportunity  cost of  all the  factor 
inputs used along the  marketing chain (Tomek and Robinson  1981). 
Product Market  Equilibrium in Fishery 
The  long-run (marginal) cost curves of  output consistent with  the  long-run biological 
yield function can  be used to represent the supply  relationships  in the  market. The 
market demand function  can  be super-imposed to  determine  the  optimal strategy  for 
fisheries  exploitation.  Assumptions  on different  producer  behavior can also  be simulated 
in terms  of  product  market equilibrium  (Fig. 3.2). In Fig. 3.2, the  line  labeled  DD is the 
demand curve for fish, AC  is the  average  cost of  output  (fish) and MC  represents the 
marginal cost  of  cutput. 
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Fig. 3.2. Market equilibrium of fishery sector in asupply-demand  model. See text for explanation. 
Generally, in an open-access fishery  each fisher operates  in such a way  that  the 
aggregate  effort expands to  a point where  the value  of  fish  caught  per unit of  effort  is 
equal to  the  cost of  effort.  In the  output space  (Fig. 3.2) such a point  is reached where 
price of  fish  equals the  average cost  per  unit of  fish  caught  (point A). Under this 
circumstance  net economic surplus  (net value of  the  fishery to  society)  reduces to  only 
consumer  surplus  (area under the demand curve above the  equilibrium  price). 
On the  other  hand, if the fishery  is managed with the  objective  of  yielding  maximum 
benefits to  society, then the  equilibrium would be reached at  the  point where  price 
equals  marginal cost  (shown by point B in  Fig. 3.2). At  this  level the  net value  to 
society would be the  area above the  marginal cost curve and below the  demand curve, 
or  in other words,  the sum of  producer  and consumer surplus. This net value,  however, 
will  include  management cost  not borne by the  industry, such as  regulations and 
enforcement  costs paid by the  taxpayer. On the  other  hand, where  management actions 
affect the  productivity  of  vessels, the  cost curves would shift, resulting  in reductions  in 
consumer  and producer surplus. These would  be management costs paid by the 
industry  (Mueller and Wang  1981). Therefore,  if the fishery operates at the open-access equilibrium,  NSB are always 
lower whereas  cost per unit of fish output is always higher than where economic 
efficiency is introduced through optimal management (the point where  price equals 
marginal cost).  However, the amount of  fish  harvested can be different. If under open- 
access equilibrium the amount of  effort or production inputs applied are below or  equal 
to  that  required to  harvest MSY, the output will be higher than suggested by or 
consistent with  maximum economic  efficiency (the output for which  NSB is maximum). 
This is shown  in diagram  (a) of  Fig. 3.2.  Again, when open-access equilibrium is only 
slightly beyond MSY, the open-access harvest is likely to be larger than the  optimal 
(maximum economic efficiency) harvest.  But if open-access harvest  is far  beyond MSY 
the opposite is likely to be the case. This is shown in diagram (b) of  Fig. 3.2. 
In an economy where resources are to be allocated to  harvest several  independent 
stockslspecies  commanding different  prices depending upon the species type and 
product processing, programming formulation can be used to determine the optimal 
harvesting strategy for  each stock/species with an objective  function that maximizes net 
economic benefit to society.  The programming model can be used to depict optimal 
solutions consistent with economic efficiency. 
Structure of  a Price Endogenous 
Fisheries Programming Model 
Individual Model 
An  individual fisher  or  fishing unit is assumed to produce some  amount  of 
homogeneous output of  fish  and compete with others for the same factors of 
production.  Each producer has a finite set of  production processes (technology) and 
alternatives, each representing a particular way  of  combining various factors to  produce 
one  unit of  output.  The  objective of  the  individual (fisher  or fishing unit) would  be to 
maximize profit. Therefore, the production process andlor alternatives that  maximize 
profit is chosen (McCarl and Spreen  1980). 
Suppose there are s different  methods of  harvesting a unit of  fish from an 
environmentlfishing ground j  composed of  i different  species.  Let C,  be the cost of 
harvesting a unit of  fish from the jth environmentlfishing ground using the sth  method. 
Denoting the  amount of fish harvest by Hie, the total cost of  harvesting will be equal to 
ZZC. .HjS. 
1- 
&suming  g different alternative ways of  processing the  harvested fish  before they 
are stored and subsequently shipped to the market as final product, denote  R i,  to  be 
the  amount of  processed fish  of  species i obtainable from  a total harvest Hi; 07  the  jth 
environmentlfishing  ground, so that  Hi,  = Ztq9i,R9ij (the variable q being the multiplier 
between harvested and processed species indicating the amount of  harvest required to 
produce one  unit of  processed fish).  If  CPgi denotes the  cost per unit of  processed fish 
of species i processed by method g, then the total processing cost for  the harvested 
species will be equal to CCCCPgijRgij. 
Assuming differences  in the cost of  transportation to the  market centers  for  each 
species processed under each of  g different  alternative ways  and transported by h 
different alternative  methods,  the total cost of  transportation can be represented by 
ZZZZCtg,i,.T.g,i,,  where T is the total amount of  processed fish and Ct is the cost of 
transportation  per unit of  processed fish at the  level of  transport. 
Let Qki be the amount of  final fish  product k of  species i sold in the market at a 
price of  Pki.  Therefore, the total revenue will be CCP,;Q,,. Given the prior assumptions, the producer's profit function  can be written as: 
where 
ZZPk;Qki  = total revenue; 
CZC.,H,  = total cost of  harvest; 
ZCC~  .:R  = total processing cost; and 
z~~~~  = total transport cost. 
Now, assume that  A,,  is the  use of  the eth  factor in the sth activity (production 
process) and Ae is the quantity of  eth factor  available to the producer. 
From the definitions given above the following constraints  occur: 
Resource Constraint 
Balance Equation between Harvesting and Processing 
where a,js  = % of species i out of  total  H,  and, Za,  = 1 
Balance Equation between Processing and Transport 
Balance Equation between  Transport and Marketing 
Thus,  the producer's problem may be formulated as the following linear programming 
problem: 
subject to  (2) to  (5) above,  and 
Given the values for  all the necessary parameters and prices, the problem can be 
solved easily via linear programming.  The  Khun-Tucker conditions provide the necessary 
and sufficient conditions for a constrained maximum at the equilibrium values of the 
variables in equation (6). Aggregate Model 
In a perfectly competitive  market, the individual producer cannot affect factor  or 
product prices. However, when the  number of  producers of  a certain sector  are 
significant consumers of  a factor or suppliers  of  a product, the  interrelationship of  prices 
and quantities  needs to  be considered in dealing with an aggregate model. 
Furthermore,  since all individual producers in a fishery  direct their  efforts in competition 
with  the others to  harvest a common stock of fish, the decision to  invest by an 
individual depends, among other factors,  on the  level and intensity of effort being 
exerted as an aggregate,  relative to the availability  and abundance of the stock of  fish. 
Such interrelationships are more clearly  reflected in aggregate models. 
Assume that the  inverse demand relation for the final product k of the sector exists 
as  given by equation (7). 
......  P,  = f(Q,,  Y),  (k = 1, 2,  n)  ...  7) 
where  Y  is a vector of  exogenous factors  and Q  is a n x  1 vector with elements which 
equal the total sector's output consumption. 
On the  other  hand, considering the smallness of  the fishery  sector  relative to  the 
agricultural sector as  a whole, we assume the supply price of  factors to be given even 
at the aggregate  level.  Nevertheless, the fact  that as effort expands the amount  of 
catch per unit of  effort declines will eventually  make the average and marginal cost  of 
output (supply function)  an increasing function of  output (Fig. 3.2). 
Therefore,  the  function relating cost to  output is given by 
where  N is a vector  of  exogenous factors  and Q is a n x  1 vector  with  elements which 
equal the total sector's  output. 
The underlying premise for  the aggregate model that would incorporate behavior of 
micro firms can then be stated as follows (McCarl and Spreen 1980): 
The production  levels of  each activity  can be determined by the first order conditions 
with which an individual producer will select a production level. Additionally,  demand 
and supply  relations lead to  an  aggregate  model wherein participants individually 
behave as small competitive units, yet collectively, price and quantities are endogenous. 
Therefore, the conditions that reflect this premise can be constructed and an 
optimization  model can be developed to  yield these conditions. This will  require 
redefining of  all variables  to  include producer dimensions.  Let H, be the  level of  harvest 
by the Ith  producer (I= 1, 2,  ...... L). Similarly,  let R,, TI and Q, be the levels of 
processing, transporting and selling activities  (in terms of  quantity of fishlfish products) 
performed by the  Ith  individual. Using these definitions, it follows  that the sectoral 
harvest of  fish  from jth environmentlfishing ground and final supply of  the  kth output are, 
respectively, 
From the above  micro conditions  the aggregate conditions can be constructed so 
that  maximization of  equation  (1) subject to  equations (2) to (5) will provide inputs for 
the  aggregate  model. In the aggregate model, however, rather than output price and cost being constant, 
it may now be given by the functional  relations (1  1) and (12), respectively. 
Assuming that both demand and marginal cost functions are linear in output space, 
and that  H and Q are the same,  price and marginal cost may be defined as follows: 
MC,  = c + d.Qk 
where a and c are scalars and b and d are row vectors; Q are quantities  of the  kth 
product. 
Given these definitions  and following procedures suggested by Samuelson (1947), it 
is possible to  formulate conditions of  equilibrium as those  of an extremum (McCarl and 
Spreen  1980). However, this step is based on two assumptions: (a) the demand and 
supply functions  are integrable, and (b) the demand and supply functions  are 
independent of  sector activity, i.e.,  the model must reflect a partial equilibrium. The 
substitution  of  product-demand function with product price and cost function with cost 
coefficients transforms the objective function for an individual given in equation  (1) into 
an  aggregate objective function shown by 
Max z*=  P,-6Q -  I MCiGQ 
subject to 
The  objective function  in equation (13) is convex (or quasi-convex) in the output 
range.  Its value gives a measure of  consumer plus producer surplus. The sum of these 
surpluses,  constituting the  net social benefit (Samuelson 1952; Takayama and Judge 
1971), is defined as the area between the demand and marginal cost curves to the  left 
of  their  intersection (Fig. 3.2). 
The price endogenous mathematical programming model for  a fishery sector 
discussed above can be characterized as a simulation of  industry behavior  under the 
assumption of  competition. The constrained optimization model takes as data production 
coefficients (A,,),  and demand and supply  (marginal cost) functions for  outputs. The 
solution to  the  model generates equilibrium prices and quantity of  outputs, and factor 
inputs. 
In deriving the  model it is assumed that the sector is composed of  many competitive 
micro units, none of which can individually  influence output or  factor prices.  Under 
appropriate  management each producer would supply according to the  rule: equate 
product price to marginal cost of  producing one  more unit of  that product. Thus, the 
sectoral supply schedule will  be an aggregate marginal cost schedule and  vice  versa. 
Similarly, each producer uses purchased factors according to  the rule: equate factor 
price to its marginal value product. Thus the sectoral derived demand for factors will be 
an  aggregate  marginal value product schedule. These schedules can be derived or 
projected internally based upon production possibilities, output demand, and factor 
supply (McCarl and Spreen  1980). Finally, the  competitive behavior simulating properties of  the  model provides a 
potentially  powerful tool for policymakers. The model allows the policy analysts to 
specify  a change designed to meet some governmental objective,  and then observe 
simulated sectoral response to the policy change.  Such analysis can  be done through 
validation  of  the  model for  base periods and updating based upon projected shifts in 
supply  and demand, then simulating response to changes induced by policies. The 
model does not assume that sectoral participants will respond to what the government 
"wants";  rather, each producer optimally adjusts  so as to maximize profits. Furthermore, 
producer adjustment is endogenous  to the  model (McCarl and Spreen  1980). 
Linear  Programming (LP) Approximation 
The  model maximand in the transformed objective function,  shown  by equation (13) 
is nonlinear in Q. However, for  linear programming approximation the technique 
described by Duloy and Norton (1975)  can be used. The  method is applicable for  both 
marginal cost and demand functions  which are assumed independent by specieslfishery 
(in the  case  of  cost) and by-product forms (in the case of  demand).  In order to set up 
the  LP Tableau,  the linear approximation procedure involves direct segmentation of the 
functions  representing the objective function  (Aguero 1983, 1987; Hazell and Norton 
1986). Each segmented function  can be decomposed into severai arbitrary subactivities 
in the  LP Tableau  (Table 3.1). 
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Notations: 
H  = total harvest cost 
C  = total postharvest cost 
W = total gross benefit 
N  = segments on total harvest cost function 
B  = segments on total postharvest cost function 
V  = segments on total benefit  function 
X  = segment variable for harvest cost function 
G  = segment variable for postharvest cost function 
D  = segment variable for benefit function 
Y  = available fish biomass 
E  = total available effort 
a  = fraction of catch handled by each region 
p  = fraction of catch going to each product form 
where 
Zaijlr <= 1, Qijlr  e= 1 and Zkijlr-pijlr e=  1 
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1  ...  1 Fig. 3.3 illustrates the decomposition procedure for the benefit segment  of the 
objective function.  The curve in the  upper diagram  (A) of  Fig. 3.3 is a downward 
sloping linear demand function. The  integral of  the demand function,  shown in equation 
(13),  is a benefit function labeled as W  in the lower diagram  (B) of  Fig. 3.3.  The curve 
W  in diagram  B is decomposed into six subactivities covering the whole  range of  the 
demand function in the diagram A.  The coefficient of  each subactivity is an area under 
the demand function corresponding to the Q defined by the subactivity. Similar methods 
can be applied to  determine the subsegments of  each of  the cost segments in the 
objective function. The segmented activities approximating the nonlinear objective 
function is linear  in its segment variables and can be readily solved by using the  LP 
technique.  Logan (1984) discussed the  necessary convexity conditions that  need to  be 
satisfied in the  linear approximation process of the individual functions  as well as their 
aggregates  in terms of  objective  function and constraints. 
A.  Demand function 
B.  Benefit  function 
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Fig. 3.3. Segmentation of demand and benefit functions for linear programming approximation 
(adapted from  Duloy  and Norton  1975). 
The Riverine Fisheries 
Model of  Bangladesh 
General Characteristics 
The mathematical model developed  in this chapter takes into account simultaneously 
the various forms of  interdependence that results from the  biology of  the  resource and 
technology and market interactions. Specifically, the  model includes: (i)  relationships 
between catch,  effort and stocks of  various species and their  interactions in terms  of 
joint  harvesting and/or  by-catch ratios; and (ii)  market interactions. 
The objective of  the  model is, therefore, to  assess the  maximum benefit that  the 
fisheries are capable of  generating  under different biotechnoeconomic and policy 
alternatives. The distribution of  benefit between consumers and producers can also  be 
evaluated in terms of  the outcome of  the  model. 
It must be noted that this  model does not include any  relationship linking parental 
stock sizes to  subsequent  recruitment and hence yield.  Thus,  the  model cannot be 
used to predict or account for  reductions of yield due to recruitment failure. We shall 
return to  this  point when  evaluating the  output  of  the model. Objective Function 
To  represent the fishery process and evaluate economic effects of alternative 
managementlpolicy  interventions in the  riverine fisheries of  Bangladesh,  the goal of 
fisheries  management has been represented in terms  of  maximizing the NSB which is 
the  sum of  producers and consumer  surplus.  The management problem is to make the 
NSB as great as possible (maximize) without violating the restrictive conditions 
(constraints) imposed by the system.  The function has been expressed in terms of 
physical output. 
Activity  Set and Constraints 
The model consists of  several blocks each representing an activity  or set of 
activities with  corresponding constraints.  Some activities are  artificially  created (pivots)  in 
order to  facilitate the sequential flow  among activities and/or to calculate  values of 
certain variables determined by the  model (e.g.,  producers income, total input use,  etc.). 
Activity  set and constraints can be grouped into three  blocks: harvesting,  postharvest 
handling (processing,  transporting,  storing and marketing),  and selling (retail demand). 
These  blocks represent biological, technological and market characteristics,  and 
interdependencies across species,  space (region) and time period of fishing (season in 
this  case)  and environment (different fishing  grounds and/or rivers in this case). 
HARVESTING BLOCK 
This  block represents the dynamics of fishery  production, its relationship with fishing 
effort and associated cost. 
1. Activities:  Harvesting activities represent the cost of fishing for each of the target 
species with  associated by-catch relationships.  The cost function reflects the  inverse 
relationship between fish  catch and fishing  effort. The bioeconomic relationships convert 
cost per unit of  effort  into cost per unit of  output.  They consist of  cost coefficients of 
catch and the technology matrix of  effort per unit of  catch for  each species.  Each 
successive unit of catch  is drawn  up from the available biomass at a higher level of 
effort, and hence at a higher level of  cost. The harvesting activities define points on the 
upward sloping  marginal cost curve defined as the integral of  one independent species 
of fish.  Cost of  catch refers only to  the catch of  the target species. Production of  by- 
catch  (species other than the directed species)  is external to each directed fishery 
(species). Therefore, they  are considered free  and costless in each directed fishery. 
The activities in this  block consist of  (i) catch (representing direct harvest cost), (ii) 
by-catch and (iii)  total  catch activities.  The latter two are pivot activities  representing 
transfer  activities for  accounting and linking with  other  blocks of  the  model (e.g., 
postharvest handling and retail selling). 
In the  LP framework the catch  activities are composed of  a set of subactivities 
(segments) representing different values  per unit of  catch defined by corresponding 
segments of  the  bioeconomic production function.  The  number  of  segments defined for 
the  subactivities is arbitrary and may be expanded to approximate the function  (see Fig. 
3.3 for  segmenting procedure). 
Externalities imposed by by-catch of  one species on the cost per unit of catch of 
the  other  is also  accounted for  in the  model in terms of  by-catch activities.  Each unit of 
principal species will accompany a ratio of  by-catch of  other species  (expressed in 
terms of  a coefficient)  which will be treated as by-catch activities  for  the  respective 
species.  However, the  by-catch will  be drawn from the stocks of  species which are  also 
vulnerable to  catch as  a target  species. Since each species is subjected to  exploitation 
both as a target species  and as by-catch, such a relationship will exhibit technological interdependencies  affecting the  cost of  one species while  increasing fishing  effort on 
the  other  species. 
2.  Constraints/Restrictions: Constraints defined for this  block are the  biomass or 
stock of  each species,  by-catch ratios, harvest limits (catch-by-catch balance), convexity 
conditions  and effort restrictions. The biomass and effort restrictions  represent the 
biological and economic relationships derived in the  bioeconomic  submodel  (see next 
section). 
Given that there  are  i different species  of  fish  harvested from j  different fishing 
environments  or grounds  (riverslgroup of  rivers) in I different seasons  over a year,  the 
activities  representing the  total annual cost of  harvest (TC,)  in the  objective function 
can  be expressed  as 
where  H is the  cumulative area under the  harvest cost (marginal) function, X  is the 
segment  variables  for  the  harvest cost function  and n is segment  of harvest cost 
function  (n = 1, .., N) 
Accordingly,  the  constraints for  this block would include: 
Direct catch: 
Effort: 
Available  biomass  (catch + by-catch): 
Convexity: 
where 
q  =  cumulative  quantity of  targetted  species  (direct catch) harvested by segment  of 
harvest cost; 
cumulative quantity  of  by-catch of  other  species; 
total quantity  of  targetted (direct) species; 
total  quantity  of  by-catch; 
cumulative  quantity of  effort  required by segment  of  harvest cost function  that 
corresponds to  the  rising portion of  the  yield-effort  curve; 
maximum available effort; 
maximum available biomass (allowable landings); and 
species  harvested as by-catch. POSTHARVEST  HANDLING BLOCK 
This block accounts  for cost involved in processing, transporting and marketing 
between ex-vessel landings and retail sales. The activities represent postharvest total 
cost of output.  The model assumes an increasing marginal cost for postharvest. The 
function can be derived from the difference between retail and ex-vessel demand 
functions (Tomek and Robinson 1981). The cost for  each species can be separated by 
geographic region as well as product form.  For each species the activity  set represents 
the total postharvest cost (area under the marginal postharvest cost curve) 
corresponding to  various segments of  total  output.  The constraints in this block include 
distribution and balancing equations and convexity conditions.  It should be noted that 
postharvest losses have not been considered in the model, for  most of  the fish species 
harvested from the  inland open waters of  Bangladesh are consumed fresh. 
Given that each of  the ith  species of  fish  harvested from  r different regions is 
transformed  into k different product forms during the  course of  processing, transporting, 
storing and marketing in the final retail market,  the activities representing total 
postharvest cost (TC,)  in the objective function can be expressed as 
TC,  = CCCCCirkb.Girkb  ...  21) 
where C is the cumulative area under the postharvest cost (marginal) function, G 
are  the segment variables for  the postharvest cost function and b are the segments of 
postharvest cost function (b = 1,  2,  ..., B). 
The constraints for  this block will be 
Harvest and postharvest balance: 
Convexity: 
where 
a  = fraction of  total product k handled in region r; 
p  = fraction of  regional catch going to product line (product form)  k; and 
CCalJk  plJlk  = 
=a,,,r  = 
ZP,,Ik  =  1  ; 
Q* = cumulative quantity of  regional share of  fish  catch by segment of postharvest 
cost. 
SELLING  BLOCK 
Selling activities represent the demand function for  each commodity/product.  If the 
products are independent in demand (zero cross elasticity),  the selling activities will 
represent the  area under the demand curve corresponding to successive segments of 
demand (see Fig. 3.3).  The coefficients of  each  activity  will thus represent the total 
benefit to  society from the  level of  demand represented by the corresponding activity. 
Thus, the activities represent points on a curve defined as the  integral of one 
independent  (in demand) fish product. If  the products are  interdependent, implying substitution in demand (nonzero cross 
elasticity),  the activities will  represent points on the benefit surface (function) defined as 
the  line  integral over the quantities of  two  or more interdependent (in demand) species 
(Duloy and Norton 1975; Agiiero  1983; Logan 1984). 
Assuming  independent demand functions for  each  of  the  kth  fish  products from each 
species of  fish,  the activities representing the total benefit (TB)  in the  objective function 
can be represented as 
where W  = cumulative area under the demand function;  D = segment  variables for 
demand the function; and v = segment of  demand function (v = 1, 2,  ..., V). 
The  constraints applicable to  this block will be 
Sales balance: 
Convexity: 
where  F = cumulative  quantity of  product sold in the retail market by segment of 
demand function. 
Given the  above description of  the different blocks, the  model can  now be specified 
to  maximize the  sum of  total benefit (TB) minus total cost  (TC1 + TC2),  i.e., 
Max Z  = -  ECCHijln.Xijl, -  CCCCCirkb.Girkb  + CCCWikv.Dikv 
subject to  the constraints (16)  to (20), (22),  (23),  (25) and (26).  A schematic of  the  LP 
Tableau  is shown  in Table 3.1. 
Model  Parameters and Functional Relations 
Continuous functional  relationships have to be considered for  harvesting, postharvest 
handling and retail selling blocks in the implemention of the model specified above. 
Accordingly, at the  harvesting level, the functional relationships  representing cost-output 
and effort-output are needed. Various  levels of  market demand (e.g., ex-vessel and 
retail demands) can be used to  establish postharvest cost structure and retail prices. 
The difference  between retail demand and ex-vessel demand would  represent the 
postharvest cost functions.  The retail demand function(s)  represent(s) the  benefit andlor 
revenue functions  in the retail selling block. 
Bioeconomic Production and Market Submodels 
This section discusses the two important submodels that provide the  basis for 
interaction of  elements in the fisheries harvesting, postharvest handling and retail selling 
blocks in the programming formulation. Bioeconomic Production and Fishery Supply 
The supply function in fisheries  originates in the production/harvest sector of  the 
fishery,  and it represents the  response of  the resource to fishing  mortality. In other 
words,  on the supply side,  fishery production from a biological pool of resources is the 
direct outcome  of  relationships  between catch  and fishing effort.  However, it is the 
market that finally absorbs the production and the  relationshtp between price and 
quantity,  known as the  economic supply function,  is established. 
As  such, it is important to  give economic configuration to the biological production 
function  (supply) through explicit  pricing of  factors that constitute the fishing effort. 
Nevertheless,  no attempts have been made to formulate a direct functional relationship 
between a fishery production and effort in the sense of  steady-state equilibrium. Rather, 
the  relations consist of  the  identification of  points in production space through the use 
of  enterprise production models by means of  aggregation. 
The establishment of the production parameters, that is to  say  activity  coefficients, is 
of  central importance to the current  modelling exercise.  These parameters will provide 
the values of  cost and effort parameters in the  harvesting block of the programming 
model. 
FISHERY  PRODUCTION FUNCTION 
Biological Production. The basic biological model of  an unexploited fishery consists 
of  a growth function that  relates natural growth to  the size (biomass)  of fish  population, 
where  natural growth (G)  is defined as recruitment (R) plus individual growth (D) minus 
natural mortality (M).  Such relationship  is exhibited in terms of  the logistic growth 
function: 
G = G(X) 
G(X) = 5 0 for  X = K, 
6G/6X = 3 0 for  X  = X,,  and 
62G/6X2 c 0  throughout 
where G is natural growth measured in terms of  biomass; X is size, also  measured in 
terms of  biomass; and K represents the level of  natural equilibrium of the stock or 
carrying capacity of  the environment. 
Bioeconomic Production. The fishery dynamics  in an exploited fishery  can be 
summarized  as follows: 
A  fish  population or  stock is a pool of  resources where  a continuous process of 
recruitment, growth and mortality is at work.  The joint  effect of  fishing mortality (F) and 
natural mortality (M) causes the population to decline in numbers.  Population biomass 
increases or  decreases according to the combined effect of  individual growth and losses 
due to  total mortality (Z = F + M).  Under equilibrium,  recruitment compensates for all 
losses in number and weight  (Beverton and Holt 1957). 
In an exploited fishery,  the catch Y  in any period will depend on  the size of  stock 
(X)  and the amount of  fishing  effort  (E)  in that period.  That is 
This function  is characterized by positive and diminishing marginal product of  X and 
E. Thus,  in the short run, for  a given X,  the  larger the  effort,  the greater is the catch 
(Y). Conversely, for  any given E, the  larger the fish stock, the greater is the catch. One can  have a family  of  short-run production (yield) curves,  each defined for  a particular 
population size. These are shown in Fig. 3.4,  where the greater the  population the 
greater will be the  yield resulting from a given level of  effort. 
Combining equations  (28) and (29) and setting  Y = G, gives: 
X*  = @(E) 
6@(E)/6E  < 0 and 62@(E)/6E2  < 0 
where  X*  is the  population equilibrium  size,  i.e.,  the fish stock corresponding  to a catch 
that  is equal to  natural growth  (Y* = G). Equation (30) represents the  population 
equilibrium  curve  (Panayotou  1985). 
Substituting equation  (30) in equation  (29) gives the  yield effort curve or the 
sustainable  yield equation  (31) 
where  Y*  is sustainable  yield in the sense that Y*  = G and that corresponding fish 
stocks  remain unaffected by fishing  (as long as  E remains constant). 
The  following  properties  hold for equation  (31): 
(a) 6~*/6~  > 0  for  OcEcEmSy 
(b) 6~*/6~  = 0  for  E=Em9 
(c) GF*/FE < 0  for  E'E,,,, 
Any  point on  F*(E) gives a sustainable  yield,  i.e.,  a catch  that  is equal to  natural 
growth  of  the  corresponding fish stock, which  can be maintained as long as effort 
remains unchanged. 
The  representation  in equation  (31) gives the  long-run steady-state yield (production) 
function  of  a fishery. Although  the  fish  stock size or  resource abundance varies  among 
fishing grounds and time periods (seasons), in the short  run,  under a defined seasonal 
context, the  fish  stock  (X)  in a particular fishery will be here assumed to  be constant. 
This  allows  estimation of  the  production function  of  the  simple form given in equation 
(32). 
where  Y  = catch and E = effort (index). 
FISHING EFFORT AND  ITS INTERNAL STRUCTURE 
The  concept of  fishing effort  occupies a central position in fisheries  economics 
literature. This is due to the  emphasis given by management regimes to  regulate one or 
more of  its components as management tools  (Clark 1976; Anderson  1977; Scott 1979). 
The  term fishing  effort in equation  (32) is a composite  input, often broken down into its 
typical  elements such as labor, capital,  material and time  spent.  These  elements  can be 
further  decomposed depending on the nature and the  type of  fishery.  For example  in 
small-scale and traditional  nonmechanized fishing,  it  is boat and gear  that  make up the 
major capital, as opposed to  engine, power block, refrigeration facilities  and fishing aids 
along with vessel  and gear that  constitute  the  major elements  of  capital  in  large-scale 
industrial fishing. The amounts of  all the capital components mentioned above, plus labor (assuming a 
fixed crew size) determine the catching power of  a fishing unit, whereas the time spent 
in fishing determines the rate of  utilization of  existing fishing capacity.  If a variety of 
fishing gear  is used, it may be necessary to classify fishing units by type of  gear used, 
as they  represent different fishing strategies and hence different catching power. For 
instance, the  use of  push nets, trawl nets, gillnets,  seine nets, hooks and line etc.,  may 
all represent different  catching power in the context of  a particular fishery. 
In fact, the operators of a fishing unit combine capital (K), labor (L), materials (M) 
and managerial skill (N) to produce catching power, which when multiplied by time (h) 
spent in fishing gives the total amount of  effort expended. This gives: 
The variable  effort  in equation (33) is typically part of  an  input combination process. 
Often, factors of  production are combined to form a composite input index of  effort, 
which becomes an input in the fishery production function (Anderson  1976; Squires 
1987). However, direct estimation of  the effort through  use of  specifications similar to 
equation  (33) may not always be practical. 
Production Models for the Riverine Fisheries of Bangladesh 
IDENTIFICATION AND  DEFINITION OF VARIABLES AND  MODELS 
The formulation of  a production model for these fisheries requires the identification 
of the important variables that define fishing effort and subsequently determine yield. 
They include:  (i) population size of  different species and their periods of abundance; (ii) 
type of environment and their geo-physical features;  (iii) type,  size and other 
characteristics  of  boat and gear; (iv) the  number of  fishers, time spent in fishing  and 
their skills;  and (v) intensity of  fishing over season (i.e.,  length of  fishing  periodlseason). 
The  major groups are hilsa, carp,  catfish and prawns, constituting 62% of  the 
average annual catch,  hilsa alone  being 44% (Table 2.2).  Moreover, the distribution  of 
these species seems to  follow spatial and seasonal patterns as described earlier. 
Although groups other than the above do  not individually constitute a separate fishery, 
their aggregate  can do so.  Fishers who catch these mixed species rather than the four 
major groups are found everywhere. As  such, these species can be said to  constitute a 
fifth fishery  based on "miscellaneous species". 
Although boat characteristics do  not differ  across fisheries except in size, the types 
of  gear used and their size exhibit wide variation  as stated in Chapter 2. 
As  regards fishing  labor, its size and skill depend on the size of  boat and gear and 
type of  gear  used. Usually fishers spend more hours in fishing during the peak months 
of  harvest than  in lean months. In addition, there are other factors that contribute to the 
harvesting process, such as floats and weights for  keeping nets upright, sails of a boat, 
lanterns and flashlights, deck facilities, etc. 
Given the above description on the variables defining effort and determining the 
resultant fish production from the  inlwd open waters, a traditional functional  relationship 
for  each individual species i at time t can be shown by equation (34) 
where  i = species  (group); t = time; Y = tonnage of  harvest; S = fishing season; A = 
river andlor fishing ground); B = boat capacity;  R = gear capacity; L = fishing crew; and 
0 = other  inputs (floats and weights, sail, lanterns, flashlights, etc.). The variables  on  the right hand side of  equation (34) can also serve as factors  that 
define an effort index similar to  that in equation (33). 
SPECIFICATIONS OF THE ECONOMETRIC MODEL 
In the absence of  confirmed biological knowledge of  the number and stock size of 
each species group and their distribution  across water areas (or rivers) and over 
seasons, fluctuation  as well as the spatial differences in both absolute and relative 
harvest of  each group can serve as a basis for  making seasonal and spatial 
distinctions.  Thus,  the production models are separated by seasons (dry and wet 
season) and rivers (four river groups). The separation of  fisheries in terms of  two 
seasons is consistent with the fishing  calendar followed by both management authorities 
and fishers. The grouping of  rivers in terms of  three principal river systems and other 
small  rivers is also consistent with the grouping followed by the Fisheries Resource 
Survey System (BFRSS) of the  Department of  Fisheries (DOF). 
While fishing seasons  (S) and rivers and/or fishing grounds (A) are distinguishable in 
the  manner discussed above, variables B,  R and 0 require further specification.  Since 
the boats vary in length, width and draft, they all are considered as principal 
determinants  of  boat capacity (B). However, these parameters usually follow a definite 
proportion,  and they  might give rise to the problem of  multi-collinearity when used as 
independent variables  in an econometric estimation model. A single measure to 
represent boat capacity could be the total volume (length x width  x draft) or tonnage. 
Khaled (1985) used tonnage of  boat capacity and found it significant in estimating the 
production technology  of  hilsa fishing  in the Meghna and Padma Rivers. 
Similarly,  capacity of  a gear  (G) depends on the type of  gear (net type,  hook or 
lines), length, depth and mesh size (in case of  net) and number of  hooks and their size 
(in the  case of  hooks and lines). Therefore, these parameters of  gear should also be 
treated as determinants  of  production. However, mesh size of  net is found to be typical 
for  a particular target but varies over seasons where the size of  fish caught is different. 
For instance, the size of  hilsa caught during the dry season is smaller than that caught 
in the wet  season. As  such, mesh size would not be significant  in explaining production 
differentials  (Khaled  1985). On the other hand, to capture differences in net type, either 
dummy variables  or  a standard unit of  gear can be used, while the size of  net can be 
measured by the surface area (m2) of  the  net. 
As  for the other inputs (0), most (e.g.,  sail, floats and weights)  are  proportional 
either to  the size of  boat or  to size of  net. Hence they can be excluded from the 
function. 
The  catch quantity  (Y) includes only that  of  the target species. Other species would 
be treated as by-catch  obtained from the effort directed to  the major species groups 
being modelled. 
Thus, an econometric model for seasonally and spatially  (riyers) distributed target 
groups can be further specified  as 
where i = groups  (1,2,..,5);  r = river (1,2,3,4);  s = season (1,2);  t = time  (year); Y = 
tonnage of production; B = tonnage of boat(s); R = surface area of net(s); L = size of 
crew; H = fishing time (hours); D = dummy variable for gear type;  and U = error term. 
The functional  relation in equation (35) is a multiple-input production function. As 
such, effects of  changes in the  effort intensity on fishing mortality are only partially 
represented by changes in each of  the  individual factor inputs. A single relation of production and effort,  is therefore,  more useful for explaining the fishery dynamics. As 
mentioned earlier, effort in equation (32) translated  in terms of  component factors in 
equation  (33) is an  index and, as such,  gives a single measure of effort.  However, the 
measurement of  an index through equation (33) may give biased resuits if the relative 
weights of  individual factors  and their variants  are arbitrary. The use of a single real 
economic factor that can serve as  an  indicator of  fishing power as a measure of  effort 
is more appropriate. Also, factor  inputs both in equations  (33) and (35) may follow a 
definite  proportion in producing effort as well as output, thereby exhibiting a high 
correlation between each other. 
Considering the above, fishing gear capacity (defined below) has been chosen as a 
measure of  effort in the current framework. This variable appeared more relevant in 
defining the fishing power of  an individual fishing unit as well  as that  of the fleet in the 
concerned fisheries,  although it is the boat that normally defines a fishing unit and 
holds the fishing crew, gear  (nets or  hooks) and other material on-board while fishing. 
The  Fisheries Resource Survey System initiated through the  FAOIUNDP used gear as a 
unit of  effort  (Tsai and Ali  1985). 
Usually, boat and crew size are weak indicators of  fishing power in small-scale 
multispecies and multigear fisheries (Prof. H.C.  Lampe, pers. comm.).  The size of  crew 
follows a proportionate  relation to the size of  gear  in a particular fishery  at a given 
time. That proportion can,  however, change independently of  gear size depending on 
the opportunity cost of  labor and overall economic situation in the country. 
Similarly, boats of  a certain size-range are found to operate with a wide range of 
gear capacity. This is because gear  is a less durable and more highly depreciable 
asset than a boat, and investment on gear depends on the financial  strength of  the 
individual fishing units. In essence, it is the size and capacity of  gear  (including the 
time spent in fishing) that makes a marked distinction  between the fishing power of 
individual fishing  units. 
Given the gear capacity as the single explanatory variable determining the 
production, the input-output relationship  in equation (35) reduces to  a more useful yield- 
effort  relationship similar to equation (32), this time with a unit measure of  effort. 
However, rather than the total tonnage of  harvest the dependent variable could as well 
be the catch per unit of  effort (CPUE) shown in terms of  equation (36). 
CPUE = G(E)  ...  36) 
where CPUE = catch per unit of  effort; and E = total fishing effort (gear capacity). 
GEAR  CAPACITY AND  METHODS OF STANDARDIZATION 
Gear capacity  is defined as: 
G=SxT 
where S = surface area of  the net(s), = lengthlpiece  x  width  (depth) x no.  of  pieces of 
net; and T = total fishing hours during the season, = total days of  fishing x average 
fishing  hours per day. 
The above definition of  gear capacity will not hold good for  all types of  gear  used in 
a particular  fishery.  In standardizing the effort (gear capacity) of  each species I have 
assigned the fishing gear that catches the major portion of  the catch as the standard. 
The  efforts of all other gear are expressed in terms of  the dominant gear by dividing 
their gross catch by the average CPUE of  the dominant gear (Tsai and Ali  1985). COST FUNCTION 
The cost component for  the harvest of each group of  fish in the objective function 
of  the programming model is expressed in terms  of fish catch.  This will  require the 
derivation of a cost function in terms  of  fish catch  (yield)  as shown in equation (37). 
where  ACq = average cost per unit of  catch;  and Y  = total catch. 
However, the bioeconomic production function, i.e.,  catch and effort relationships 
and market cost or opportunity cost of  effort,  has a direct bearing on the unit cost of 
fish  output (Copes  1970; Anderson  1977).  For a given level of  population size or fish 
stock 
AC,  = ACelCPUE  ...  38) 
where  Ace  = cost per unit of  effort. 
The definition in equation (38)  assumes a constant cost per unit of  effort and a 
declining CPUE as effort expands.  Therefore, one would expect an increasing cost per 
unit of catch,  making equation  (37) an increasing function of  catch  (Y).  In a long-run 
perspective, this function increases until the  maximum sustainable yield is reached and 
bends backward (decreases)  thereafter.  However, different  levels of  population would 
give different cost curves each  representing a particular short-run situation.  Fig. 3.5 
shows a family of  short-run total cost curves,  whose  derivation can be made direct from 
the short-run yield curves given earlier  in Fig. 3.4. 
The ranking of  population in Fig. 3.5  is reversed (from Fig. 3.4),  in the sense that 
the smaller the  population, the  more it costs to  achieve any given yield (Cunningham et 
al.  1985). Since the short-run total cost of  an output curve  increases at an increasing 
rate  (Fig. 3.5),  both short-run average and marginal cost curve would also  increase 
(Fig. 3.6). 
Each set of  short-run cost curves is defined for  one population level only. Thus, a 
change in the population size will shift the fishery  to  a new set of  curves.  A fall  in 
population will  result in an  upward shift of  curves while  an increase will shift them 
downwards.  Considering the growth phases of  a fishery  as similar to  the movements of 
population to different sizes over time these short-run curves could be made to  reflect 
the various stages of  its exploitation phases. 
In the  long run, considering a steady-state situation for  the fishery,  however, the 
cost function will  increase up to the catch limit of  maximum sustainable yield and bend 
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Fig. 3.4. Short-run yield curves as a function of  nominal 
efforts (adapted from Cunningham et al.  1985). 
Fig. 3.5. Short-run total cost as a function of  fish output. backward thereafter,  implying a decline  in the  steady-state  harvest as further  expansion 
of  effort takes  place. This  is shown in  Fig. 3.7 where the backward bending curve AC 
is the  long-run average  cost curve  in terms  of  fish  catch for the  fishery as a whole.  It 
can  be derived directly from the  sustainable  yield curve  and the  total cost curve for 
effort (Anderson 1977). 
The short-run curves also  play a part in determining  the  path of  the  long-run curve. 
The  curves  labeled ACp,and  AC , in Fig. 3.7 show  how the  average cost per unit of 
fish  varies with  output at two difierent population sizes (Anderson  1977). These curves 
imply that the  average  cost of  fish will increase as catch gets larger.  Moreover, the cost 
curve for the  smaller  population size  (P,)  Is higher than the  one for  the  larger 
population size  (P,).  r 
Output 
Fig. 3.6. Short-run average and marginal cost curves for 
fish output 
Output 
Fig. 3.7. Long-run average cost curve of  fish output 
in a steady-state fishery. 
These short-run curves will intersect the  long-run cost curve at the  sustainable  yield 
for the  given  level of  population. Conversely,  on  each short-run average cost curve 
there  will  be one point that  could continue into the long run. The  long-run average  cost 
curve  is then  the  locus of  all such points  (Cunningham et  al.  1985). 
COMPONENTS OF COST 
Cost for  a given fishing  unit comprises fixed and variable  cost.  Variable  cost 
includes: labor, fuel for  lanterns and batteries for  flashlights,  food,  maintenance  and 
repair of  boat and gear,  purchase of  nondurable goods, and fishing  license fee  or  toll. 
In a given fishing period, variable  costs can be defined straightforwardly  as the  sum 
of  cost of  all  inputs that are incurred when the fishing  unit operates.  Quantitatively, the 
most  important costs  in the  case  of  nonmotorized inland fisheries  in  Bangladesh are 
those spent on  labor  (including food)  and replacement and maintenance  of  nets. 
Normally, nets are  considered fixed  inputs.  However, in a given season they  are 
replaced wholly  or  partly for  reasons such as high rate of  wear and tear  and accidental 
losses (Khaled 1985). Therefore, maintenance cost of  nets appears quite significant. 
Traditionally, fixed costs  include: interests on  borrowed funds and rentals for  capital 
items, and depreciation and opportunity  cost of  own capital  (e.g., boat, gear). 
Interest payments on borrowed funds  are quite significant  in the  case of  riverine 
fishing  in Bangladesh. Normally,  in the  beginning of  the  fishing season  a large amount 
of  working capital is required to  prepare the  unit for  fishing  operations. This capital  is 
used to  buy the  nondurable items like utensils, stoves, lanterns, flashlights,  etc., to 
repair the  gear and boat and their  complements,  and to  buy additional gear to  increase the fishing capacity of  the unit. The source of  such capital is from usury sources 
(private moneylenders  or fish  traders), and they usually charge a rate of interest 
ranging from 8 to  10% per  month (BCAS 1987). 
To calculate depreciation  (d), the purchase price or  capital  cost (P,)  of such fishing 
assets such as boats, anchors and nets,  their economic life (L) and their scrap or 
salvage value  (S) are needed. 
However, calculation of  depreciation for boats or nets is not important as a 
component  of  cost in the context of  fishing.  In fact,  in fishing operations constant  repair 
and maintenance  keep the asset almost equally productive for  a longer time than 
contemplated in the  approach of  depreciating the asset at a certain rate.  Moreover,  if 
proper repair and maintenance costs are included in the calculation of cost,  inclusion  of 
typical depreciation  allowances may result in double  counting. 
Aside  from these, there  is a wide range of  variations  in the structure  of  fishing 
costs, delivered through several channels;  modes of  payment for each of them vary 
across fishing  unit and fishing ground.  Important among them  are labor and capital 
items.  In terms of  the  previous definition  of  cost,  labor cost is treated as a variable 
cost. This assumes a fixed wage  rate, similar to that of  hired labor in agriculture. 
However, in practice, it is common for  the crew to be paid a share of  the value of 
catch  instead of  the  fixed wage  rate.  In addition, among individual crew  members, 
payment or share varies  according to skill  and role in the fishing process. This 
procedure applies to  owner's labor also,  and thus  makes such cost a real one. 
Similarly,  if capital items such as boat and gear are rented by the fishing unit, 
payment is made most of  the  time  in terms of  a share of  catch, instead of  cash  rents. 
This is a common practice when the  crew members provide some of  the  capital  items 
to  be used by the  fishing units. 
The Market Submodel 
A quantitative analysis of  demand-supply and price relationships  of  different  species 
of fish is necessary to  provide an appropriate  price mechanism in the  programming 
model. The parameters  of  econometrically  estimated functions  are required as inputs 
into the  programming model to  determine solutions to the market model simultaneously 
with the  other submodels (technological  and biological). 
The price analysis will provide two  important informations: (i) specific economic 
coefficients (parameters) such as price and income elasticities (or flexibilities)  of  demand 
(or prices);  and (ii) forecasts of  prices or variables  affecting prices. 
The  model was  conceived  at three  levels, i.e.,  ex-vessel, wholesale  and retail 
markets between the fishers  and the  consumers  in terms of  important determinants, 
although the  model for wholesale  market could not be estimated because of lack of 
data. Effort was  made to isolate and demonstrate spatial differences  and seasonal 
changes  in the  demand for  each of  the  fish species,  especially at the  ex-vessel level. 
The  model contains  equations wherein  the  functional  relations of  the  major determinants 
of  supply  and demand are postulated. 
EX-VESSEL MARKET 
The ex-vessel  market refers to the  market where fishers deal with  the first buyers. 
The buyers are  mostly assemblers  or collectors. The process of  collecting is confined to 
the  area comprising the fishing grounds  up to  assembly points or landing sites.  A large 
number of  nonmotorized (a few  motorized)  boats are engaged in collecting fish from the 
small fishing  units scattered over  the  fishing grounds  in the  riverine waters in different regions of  the country. The conduct at this  level is rather simple.  Harvested fish are 
channelled to the assembly point by a group of  middlemen (agents) whose numbers are 
more or  less limited, having some informal agreement with the harvesters with regard to 
the transaction. 
Variables that reflect behavior of  price in this market are: the level of  harvest, their 
size and quality,  the fishing ground, cost of  transportation, existence of  landing stations 
and their proximity to  the fishing grounds, weather conditions affecting harvesting 
activity and seasonal abundance of  harvest. 
Although markets are separated between locality or  area of  fishing and hence prices 
of  individual fish species in each market would differ, the free flow of  information 
among markets can easily act against marked price differential among small local ex- 
vessel  markets. 
The existence of  a strong seasonality in the abundance and availability  of  various 
groups of  fish  in different fishing grounds would also influence the pricing of  fish in 
each market. This might give rise to separate seasonal markets at the ex-vessel level 
reflecting seasonal differences. 
Distinction between markets can also be made by region as there are important 
differences  in the availability and abundance of  species in each region as well as final 
demand conditions. 
Another factor  that could affect the pricing mechanism is the  market power of 
buyers (collectors)  and sellers that determine the degree of  competition in each 
individual  market. At  the ex-vessel market buyers are able to  exert some extra- 
economic power on the sellers because of  credit ties, the buyers being the suppliers of 
capital for fishing to  the sellers (fishers). The existence of  such force could possibly 
distort the competitive pricing process. However, as the numbers of  buyers and sellers 
become large and there is better flow of  information between markets, the distorting 
forces  become weaker. The same is true in the long-run, whereby forces of  competition 
would correct such distortions. 
Also,  if  the flow of  information on prices and harvest is perfect, the prices prevailing 
in other areas affect the price in a particular market and vice versa. The distance 
between the  area of  fishing and the  landing center also affects the price through  its 
effects  on communication means, transport cost, postharvest handling and freshness. 
However, if  the flow of  information is perfect and complete among markets, other things 
remaining the same, the prices in each market will only differ by the extent of  transport 
costs. 
Since the demand at the ex-vessel market is derived from the upper markets 
(wholesale and retail), the prices in the  upper markets, especially the wholesale price, 
directly  influence the price in the ex-vessel market. 
On the demand side, a particular ex-vessel market price at any point in time (t) 
would generally  depend on the landings. As  stated earlier, the production (supply side 
of  the fishery)  being dependent upon various exogenous factors, it is the quantity 
demanded that determines the price, at least in the short run. As  such it is more logical 
to  conceive the  demand in terms of price (Farrell and Lampe 1965; Waugh and  Norton 
1969; Wang  1976; Bockstael 1977; Storey and Willis  1978; DeVoretz 1982; Wang et  al. 
1978, 1986; Cook and Copes 1987). 
Thus, separating  markets by species, locality,  landing center, fisheries  region and 
seasons of  fishing we  can state the ex-vessel demand prices (Pvd)as: where  i  = species 
j  = locality/ area of  fishing 
k  = landings market 
I  = fisheries region 
m  = season of  fishing 
t  = time period (a month) 
Qi  = landing quantities of  the species 
Si  = size (or weight) of  landed species 
Po,x  = composite prices of  other species 
P,,,,,  = average price of  species (i) in the upper (wholesale) market(s). 
The supply side of  the market for fish at the ex-vessel level needs special 
explanation.  Unlike many other industrial and agricultural commodities, the supply of  fish 
in the short  run is governed more by biological, environmental and technological factors 
than by price. Such factors are dominant in the  short and medium run. Moreover, fish 
are usually  marketed fresh. As  such, the important determinant of  supply is the current 
rate of fishing mortality and past history of  mortality rates, which in turn are determined 
by the aggregate  level of  effort devoted to fishing and also on catchability  coefficient 
(Lampe 1967). If the level of  fishing does  not change (which is likely in the short  run), 
the supply is predetermined by natural factors in a particular ex-vessel market. 
In the  long run, however, supply (harvest) of  a fish species will be affected by its 
price, prices of other species, prices or  opportunity cost of  inputs (effort) and 
productivity of  inputs (amount of  effort per unit of  output). 
The  ex-vessel supply (QvS) of  a particular species (i), in a particular local ex-vessel 
market (j), within  a landing center (k), region of  fishing (I), season (m) and at time 
period (t) can, therefore,  be regarded as predetermined as shown in equation (40). 
where  'A' is a predetermined value of  landings of species (i), which is the outcome of 
several exogenous natural and physical factors.  Hence, the supply price is perfectly 
flexible with respect to  given quantities  of  ex-vessel landings. 
The  above formulation assumes separate markets for each locality or area of 
fishing.  As  such, markets are considered relatively thin and are confined to  a limited 
number of  buyers and sellers who  are isolated from their counterparts in other areas. 
However, if one  considers the free flow of  information on price, landings of  species  and 
other variables  affecting price relations, these small markets could be aggregated into 
one single market over a region or  at least over a landing center for wholesale  trading. 
This generalization  appears more realistic as discussed in the next section (section on 
wholesale  market) in that the market operating between the fishers and assemblers/ 
collectors  is part of  the same market based in the landing centers or  docksides.  In fact, 
the collectors/ assemblers are in most cases the commission agents or  buying agents 
of  the fish traders based in the landing centers or dockside markets (FAO/Rapport 
1986). 
Based on the above generalization  the specification of  demand and supply  model 
within the regions can be simplified. 
WHOLESALE MARKET 
At  this level demand is broad with alternatives available. Moreover, the market is 
stretched  in a long chain (vertical and horizontal) of  intermediaries spread all over the 
region/country dealing with the fish before it goes to the retail market. The chain of  marketing immediately after the first level of  wholesale (sale by the 
assemblers or  collectors)  is complex,  involving movement across  regional boundaries 
and changes of  intermediaries and dealers.  Therefore,  the  number of variables  that 
enters into the market clearing process can be quite large depending on the stage of 
wholesale  in the  marketing chain in the  course  of  horizontal and vertical movement of 
fish.  Important among them are:  prices (including other species),  net amount of  fish 
available for wholesale  (including other species),  regional location of  fishing and 
markets, distance  between assembly  point and wholesale  market, type and extent  of 
postharvest  handling operations,  means of  transport and its cost, regional preference for 
the species, prices in the  retail market and seasonality. 
Although  markets at the wholesale levels consist of two submarkets and several 
intermediate stages performing marketing functions they can be simplified into one level 
by treating the first  level wholesale  market (i.e.,  the transaction between collectors or 
assemblers  as part of  the  ex-vessel market and subsuming the other intermediate 
market levels into the final wholesale  market (urban or  suburban wholesale  markets) 
along the  chain  as transportation  and commission service activities. 
Even though supply at the ex-vessel level is predetermined, at the wholesale  level it 
would be considerably affected by price, as the amount  of  fish inflows and outflows to 
and from each region will  respond to price movements. The net flow  (regional import  - 
regional export) will  be a function of  price. Therefore,  at the wholesale level the  net 
supply quantity  (which is different from  landing quantities) will become a determinant of 
price or vice versa. 
Given the  above simplifications the wholesale price equations for demand (Pwd)  and 
quantity  equations for  supply (QwS)  for  a species (i), in region (I)  and season (m)  can be 
represented by equations (41)  and (42). 
where  i  = species 
I  = region 
m  = season of  fishing 
t  = time period (a month) 
Qwi = quantities of  the species (i) demanded 
Si  = size of  species  (i) 
Pwx  = composite  prices of  other species 
-Pri = price of  species (i)  in the upper (retail)  market 
Np  = size of  population 
where  i  = species 
I  = region 
m  = season of fishing 
t  = time period (a month) 
Q,,  = Q[(landings) + M(import)  -  F(export)] 
Pwi = price of  species  (i) 
Pwx  = composite prices of  other species (x) 
Pri  = price of  species  in the upper (retail)  market 
PwZ  = wholesale price of  species (i)  in other  regions. RETAIL MARKET 
This market represents the  primary demand (consumer demand) from which 
demands  in the  lower markets are derived. Transactions take place between retailers 
and consumers.  At  this level variables  that are important determinants of  supply- 
demand and price relationships are quantities and prices of  fish and other substitute 
goods, income, population and taste.  However, since  individual retail markets are 
scattered and have considerable difference in terms of  transport  and communication as 
well  as  purchasing power of  the consumers (e.g.,  urban and rural), distinct independent 
local or  regional retail markets can exist. 
In functional form the  price equation  for demand (Prd)  and quantity equation for 
supply (QrS)  at the  retail level can be represented in terms of  equations (43)  and (44), 
respectively. 
where  i  = species 
I  = region 
m  = season of fishing 
t  = time period (a month) 
Qr,  = quantities of  the species (i) demanded in the retail market 
S,  = size of  species (i) 
Prx = composite  prices of  other species 
Pa  = prices of  substitute  animal proteins 
Np  = size of  population served by the  retail market 
In  = personal income of  consumer 
Cf, = consumer  preference for fish  (i) 
where  i  = species 
I  = region 
m  = season of  fishing 
t  = time period (a month) 
Pr  = price in the  retail  market 
Prx = price of  other species 
Pa  = price of  other animal proteins 
SPECIFICATION OF THE ECONOMETRIC MODEL 
In the  definition of  general economic relationships in the previous sections we  have 
seen that the  role of  price (demand) is more important in the  market model, at  least in 
the  ex-vessel market. Moreover,  in a market where supply is predetermined at a given 
time  't', it is the variable  'P' (price) that  is required to  be determined. The quantities can 
at  best be assumed to  be determined recursively,  i.e.,  supply  is determined by past 
prices (Tomek and Robinson 1981). Keeping this  in view, the  interest in the following 
sections will be to  specify the  demand equations  for  econometric estimation. MARKET DEMAND EQUATIONS 
In our demand model price is the logical dependent variable,  while  quantity of  fish 
as well  as prices and/or quantities of  other substitute goods are specified as 
independent variables. There are other independent variables that will also be used in 
the  model as  important explanatory variables in estimating demand equations for 
different  market levels. Moreover, since one of  the objectives of  the model building is to 
simulate price movements, it is quite logical to treat prices as a dependent variable 
(Waugh  1964; Tomek and Robinson 1981). Two recent studies by Wang et al.  (1986) 
and Cook and Copes (1987) followed similar specifications, consistent with previously 
cited fishery economic models,  e.g.,  Farrell and Lampe (1965),  Waugh and Norton 
(1  969), Bockstael (1  977) and DeVoretz (1  982). 
AGGREGATION OF SUBMARKETS 
Some of  the submarkets at various  market levels,  defined earlier,  can be aggregated 
into a single market with  regard to the formulation of  empirical function expressing the 
demand equations at various  market levels. Such aggregation has been applied over 
space, species of fish  and time. 
Spatial aggregation. The specification of  demand function for ex-vessel market within 
the space of  the  region will bring all scattered local markets and landing centers within 
one  region under the influence of the same  market forces and other  exogenous factors. 
Such simplification is logical considering the fact  that ex-vessel prices generated at the 
landing markets are based upon the flow  of  information and competition among buyers 
and sellers  in regional, ex-vessel, and wholesale  markets. The  Padma-Meghna and 
Brahmaputra river system divides the whole  country into four  separate  geographic 
regions. These four  regions are quite distinct in terms of  availability of  fisheries 
resources, means of  transport and communications. On this basis,  therefore,  we 
aggregated the small and segregated  markets into four  regional markets comprising the 
regions defined as  SE  (southeast), SW  (southwest),  NE (northeast) and NW (northwest) 
parts of  the country.  In the empirical models three instead of  four  regions have been 
distinguished  by  combining the southeast  (SE) and northeast (NE)  regions into a single 
region.  However, at the  retail level the  aggregation will be broadened to reduce the 
regions into a single  retail market. 
Species aggregation. There are many varieties of  species of  fish  captured from the 
rivers. However, not all of  them  are important in terms of  ability to form a separate 
market.  In fact, a great many of  them are similar biologically and ecologically and/or 
have similar  preference among buyers in terms of  price and tastes. 
The  model considers six  separate species markets, one each for four  major  species, 
i.e.,  hilsa, carp,  catfish and prawn. The fifth  market  includes the  remaining categories of 
fish  (miscellaneous fishes) harvested from the open waters. The sixth  market is 
considered for  large prawns, since  a sizeable quantity of  large prawns are exported. 
Temporal aggregation. Given the  pattern of  periodicity  in the catch rates of  different 
species of  fish,  two  distinct seasonal markets (wet and dry season)  have been 
distinguished for  each species, which are quite  consistent with the fishing calendar 
followed by small-scale riverine fishing.  Based on the above, the  monthly markets have 
been aggregated into two  different seasonal markets. The months covered under each 
season are: April-September for the wet season and October-March for the dry  season. 
FUNCTIONAL FORM AND  CHOICE OF VARIABLES 
In selecting the  functional  form, simplicity was  considered as one  of  the important 
criteria,  although care was  exercised to conform to the  criteria of  mathematical properties of  functions and statistical tests.  We defined the demand functions  at various 
levels in terms of  equations (45) to  (47). 
where  i  = species (1,  2, ..., 5) 
I  = region (1, 2, 3) 
m  = season  (1,  2) 
t  = monthlyear 
Pv, = ex-vessel price of  species (i) 
Pw, = wholesale price of  species (i) 
Pr,  = retail price of  species (i) 
Qv, = landed quantity of  species (i) 
Qw, = net wholesale quantity traded in the region 
= Qv, + Mi -  Fi 
= landed quantity + regional import -  regional export 
Qr,  = retail quantity of  species (i) 
Pvx = ex-vessel price of  other species 
Pwx=  wholesale price of  other species 
Pr,  = retail price of  other species or substitute products 
Pv, = ex-vessel price of  species (i) 
Pwi = price of  species (i) in the wholesale market 
Pr,  = price of  species (i) in the retail market 
Np  = populaton size 
In  = personal income 
Si  = size of  fish caught. 
Price Differences  Between  Market Levels 
and Postharvest  Cost 
A  relationship between demand functions  at various  market levels (equations (45) to 
(47)) can now be established in terms of  marketing margins, defined as the difference 
between primary and derived demand curves for  a particular fishlfish products (Tomek 
and Robinson 1981). In such a case,  retail demand function  representing the primary 
demand is determined by the  response of  the  ultimate consumer, while the ex-vessel 
and wholesale demand functions are derived demand functions determined by the  price 
quantity  relationship which exists  at the ex-vessel level or  an intermediate point where 
fish  is purchased by wholesalers or processors. Thus, given several simplifying 
assumptions, the derived demand for  fish  at the ex-vessel and/or wholesale  levels  is 
obtained by subtracting the  per unit costs (prices) of  all the marketing and processing 
components from the primary demand functions.  Fig. 3.8  shows demand curves at two 
market levels (ex-vessel and retail),  assuming a perfectly elastic supply functions for 
marketing services (Tomek and Robinson 1981). Derived supply  (retall) 
Primary supply (ex-vessel) 
Primary demand (retail) 
Ex-vessel 
Derived demand (ex-vessel 
0 
I  Quantity  per  unit  time 
Fig. 3.8.  Relationships  between market levels  in terms of  marketing 
margins of  fish output. 
By a similar  analogy the concepts of  primary and derived supply can also be 
established.  Primary supply  refers to  the  relationship  at the  ex-vessel level. By adding 
an  appropriate  margin supply  relations  at other  levels (e.g.,  retail) can be derived. A 
retail price is established  at the  point where  primary demand and derived supply 
intersect  (Fig. 3.8).  Ex-vessel price is based on derived demand and primary supply. 
The  difference between two  prices can  be treated as the  marketing  margin or cost  of 
postharvest handling (processing, transporting and marketing)*. This concept was 
utilized to  derive postharvest cost functions  specified in the  postharvest  block of 
programming model. 
'This  analysis is  based on  the assumption of  a competitive market structure where  price is considered as  the 
integrating force  between market  levels. For  an illustration  on this concept see Tomek and  Robinson (1981). CHAPTER 4 
PARAMETER ESTIMATION: BlOECONOMlC AND  MARKET SUBMODELS 
Bioeconomic Submodel 
Production and Cost Equations 
Since the programming model is cast in a long-run framework, the cost coefficients 
must be derived from a long-run production function.  Unfortunately, precise estimates 
for  a long-run production function  (yield function) are impossible at this stage as time 
series of  catch and effort on each of  these fisheries (either separate or in aggregate) 
are not available.  Instead, a short-run relationship of  yield and effort [equation (36)] was 
used, and subsequently the relationship of  cost and yield shown in equation (37) was 
established for the current level of  population through modelling individual fishing 
enterprises for each of  the five species of  fish  mentioned earlier. 
Also, the  models for each species were separated by season (two seasons) and 
river groups (four groups). While separate equations were estimated for individual 
species in each season, dummy variables were used to capture structural differences in 
cost and production between the enterprises operating  in different river groups. 
Equation (48) shows the structure  of  the cost function finaliy chosen for econometric 
estimation. 
where 
i  = species (1,2,..,5); 
I  = season (1,2); 
Q= quantity  of  catch in weight; 
Dk= dummy variables for  river groups (D,,D,,D,). 
Given the short-run yield and cost curves for a given population size, the movement 
of  the fishery with varying population sizes could be traced with the help of  catchability 
coefficients,  defined as the fraction  of  total stock removed by each unit of  effort, 
assumed to  be constant for  each level of  population size in the different fisheries.  In 
such a case, a catchability  coefficient for  a fishery at any given level of  population size 
will be proportional to the CPUE. 
In determining such coefficients the  relative fish population/stock size in different 
fisheries  at current times  in terms of  density or  current catch levels can be used. The 
values of  current catchability  coefficients  in different fisheries will  indicate the relative 
status of  each fishery  and the movement of  long-run yield and cost functions as the 
population/stock size  moves towards low to high or  vice versa. 
The  movement of  production traced through the procedure described above may not 
yield the true function through which each individual long-run production would  move. 
However, in a sectoral framework, where effort allocation among fisheries follows 
interdependencies,  identification  of  relative positions will suffice the  need of  the true 
function for  analysis of  policies and management issues. Data 
Data were  obtained from  a cross-sectional survey of  fishing units operating in the 
rivers.  The samples include fishing units operating in the three  main river systems 
(Meghna, Padma and Jamuna-Brahmaputra)  and three small rivers representing other 
river groups in the present modelling framework.  In selecting the sample we  used the 
Fisheries Department's survey of  fishing village and fishing boats as the  main reference 
(DOFIBFRSS 1982). The  number of  fishing boats recorded in this survey was  roughly 
proportional to the estimated number of  fishing units operating in different rivers (Table 
34 - Appendix  A).  Based on the fishing village and fishing boat survey information,  12 
areas in nine different districts covering the four river groups (Table 35 - Appendix  A) 
were  identified. The district(s) chosen for  each river group were those  constituting the 
largest fraction  of  total area under the river group (Table 33 - Appendix  A). 
The  survey areas were  selected on the criterion of  large concentrations of  fishing 
households to  minimize cost and time and to obtain adequate samples from  each area. 
A  total of  415 samples were  randomly selected  (Table 35 -  Appendix  A)  from  among 
the list of  fisherslfishing  units available with the local fisheries officers (in most cases 
only a partial list was  available). 
The sampling design (Table 36 - Appendix  A)  showed only the distribution of  fishing 
units by river grol;p  and season.  Selection of  sample fishing  units by target species 
was  not possible due to  a lack of  information in the sampling frame on the target 
species  of  ihe fishing  unit. Data on input-output and costs were  obtained for  each 
fishing season by administering a structured questionnaire (Appendix  B). The period 
covered was the  1987-88 fishing year  (April-March) separated into the two seasons  - 
wet  season  (April -  September)  and dry season (October -  March). 
Some important procedures followed in obtaining the data are as follows: input- 
output and cost data were obtained on a daily basis since the fishers customarily keep 
records and/or  recall expenses for their day's fishing operation.  Seasonal figures  were 
obtained through  multiplying by the total number of  fishing days per season.  In 
calculating the effort and cost per unit of  effort only  output of  the direct  (target) species 
group was  considered. Catches of  other species were  considered incidental and treated 
as by-catch that augments income from fishing. 
The  raw data were processed using the statistical package SPSSPC*. 
Estimation and Results 
The  estimation  of regression equations followed the usual ordinary least squares 
(OLS). A  linear functional form was fitted for equation (48). However, the dependent 
variable ACq was  first computed using the formula  in equation (38) before applying the 
OLS. 
Although  in each season models for each species in each river group were  treated 
as separate, while performing the estimation a single regression was  performed for all 
river  groups, keeping only seasonal models separate (see specifications in equation 
(48)). However, dummy variables were  used to distinguish one  river group from the 
others in terms of  production and cost structure in the cases of  hilsa, carp, catfish and 
miscellaneous fish.  For prawn, a single  regression was  performed combining datasets of 
all four  river groups and two  seasons. Two sets of  dummy variables were  used to 
represent differences  due to season and river groups. This was done to  have a larger 
sample size and thereby  gain more degrees of  freedom. 
Table 4.1  shows the estimated average cost  (ACq) equations for different species of 
fish  in the  rivers. As  seen in Table 4.1, the  'F' values  of  AC  equations for all the 
fisheries  are significant.  For hilsa and miscellaneous species fisheries, for instance, the Table 4.1. Regression of average cost for a fishing unit in different riverine fisheries of Bangladesh. 
Hilsa 
wet season  (n = 210) 
AC =  8.78  +  0.00086Q  -  1.60D1  -  3.71D2 
(0.61)  (4.74)"'  (-1.55)  (-0.31) 
R sq.  = 0.27, R*  sq.  = 0.25.  F =  13.28"' 
dry  season  (n =  125) 
AC =  3.14  +  0.00056Q  +  11.01D1  +  15.73D2 
(8.05)"'  (4.70)"'  (1.40)  (1.81). 
R  sq.  = 0.32,  R* sq.  = 0.29,  F =  10.89"' 
Carp 
wet season  (n = 50) 
AC  =  16.2  +  0.000750  +  1  l.8Dl  +  2.2302 
(1.021)  (1.68)'  (1.85)'  (1.31) 
R  sq.  = 0.42,  R'sq.  = 0.38,  F = 5.5*** 
dry  season  (n = 80) 
AC=28.20  +  0.00041Q  -  10.54D1  -  5.77D2 
(2.51)"'  (4.06)"'  (-  1  .go)*  (-1.71). 
R sq. = 0.63,  R'  sq.  = 0.56,  F = 8.49"' 
Catfish 
wet  season  (n = 62) 
AC=  8.91  +  0.00027Q  -  17.64Dl  +  19.45D2 
(7.25)"'  (1.78)'  (-.85)  (2.31)' 
R sq. = 0.64,  R* sq. = 0.52, F = 5.29"' 
dry  season (n = 87) 
AC =  10.91  +  0.029Q  +  3.38D1  +  19.45D2 
(1.45)  (4.1 7)'-  (0.92)  (1.66)' 
R sq. = 0.32,  R* sq. = 0.28,  F = 4.72"' 
Prawn 
all season  (n = 45) 
AC  =  26.36  +  0.034Q  +  34.38Dl  +  39.97D2 
(5.47)***  (1.93)*  (1.72)  (1  .86)* 
R sq.  = 0.58, R* sq.  = 0.45,  F = 4.38"' 
Miscellaneous 
wet  season  (n = 68) 
AC  =  2.62  +  0.001  75Q  +  14.07Dl  +  7.01 D2 
(1  0.92)"'  (9.06)"'  (2.26)"  (1.84)' 
R sq.  = 0.64,  R* sq.  = 0.52,  F = 5.29"' 
dry  season  (n = 93) 
AC  =  2.83  +  0.0126Q  +  9.95D1  +  6.42D2 
(0.82)  (2.20)'"'  (2.30)**  (1.26) 
R sq.  = 0.29,  R'  sq.  = 0.26,  F = 3.72"' 
Notes: 
AC  = average  cost of catch; 
Q  = total  catch; 
Di = dummy variables for  rivers (i =  1, 2,  3); (Dl =  1 for  River  1 and 0 otherwise);  (D2 =  1 for 
River  2 and  0 otherwise); (D3  =  1 for  River  3 and 0 otherwise); 
S  = seasonal  dummy  variable; (S =  1 for  dry season and 0 for  wet  season); 
significant at  looh 
"  significant at  5% 
"' significant at  1% 
F values  are significant  at  1%  in both dry and wet  seasons. Similarly, the  't' values 
(two-sided) for  the output  coefficients  in the AC equations are significant  for all 
fisheries.  In the  case of  dummy variables  representing different  rivers and seasons (in 
the  case of  prawn), most of them are significant. The  (adjusted) R2 are, however, lower than 0.50  in most cases. The  lowest R2 is observed for the miscellaneous species 
fishery  in the dry season (0.26). 
The AC  equations for each fishery in Table 4.1  can be separated by river groups 
and seasons. Table 4.2 shows AC  equations for the hilsa fishery separated by river 
groups in each season. The AC  equations for other fisheries are shown in Table 37 - 
Appendix A. 
Again, assuming that the cost parameters for the micro firms correspond to those for 
the entire fishery,  the aggregate AC functions can be derived from the micro functions 
shown in Table 4.2 and Table 37 - Appendix A.  The aggregate AC  equations for each 
species separated by river group in each season are shown in Table 38 - Appendix A. 
Notice that the  intercepts of  the aggregate AC  equations are the same as those of the 
corresponding sample AC  equations, while only the slopes are different.  In deriving the 
slope of  the aggregate AC  equations the aggregate average catch per season for the 
entire fishery  has been substituted  into the sample AC  equation at the average catch 
rate for the sample,  using the formula given below: 
where 
C* = slope of  aggregate AC  equation; 
c* = slope of  sample AC  equation; 
q-  = average catch rate for the sample; 
Q-  = average catch rate for the fishery. 
The aggregate AC  functions for hilsa fishery  are shown in Table 4.3. 
Table 4.2.  Computed average cost equations 
for  a hilsa fishing unit in various seasons in 
the riverine fisheries of  Bangladesh. 
River group  Equations 
River 1 
-dry season  AC  = 11.62 +  0.00056q 
-wet season  AC  =  7.185+  0.00086q 
River 2 
-dryseason  AC  =18.87+0.00056q 
-wet season  AC  =  5.075+ 0.00086q 
River 3 
-dry  season  AC  = 25.05  +  0.00056q 
-wet season  AC  = 30.85 +  0.00086q 
River 4 
-dry season  AC  =  3.14 +  0.00056q 
-wet season  AC  =  8.78 +  0.00086q 
Table 4.3. Aggregate average cost equations 
for  hilsa  fishery  in  various  seasons  in the 
riverine fisheries of  Bangladesh. 
River group  Aggregate AC equations 
River 1 
-dry season  AC  = 11.62  + 0.0002890 
-wet season  AC  =  7.185+  0.00021Q 
River 2 
-dry  season  AC  = 18.87 + 0.00285Q 
-wet season  AC  =  5.075+ 0.00312Q 
River 3 
-dry season  AC  = 25.05  +  0.00225Q 
-wet season  AC  = 30.85  +  0.0035Q 
River 4 
-dry season  AC  =  3.14 ;  0.00057Q 
-wet season  AC  =  8.78 +  0.00029Q 
-  -~--~ 
Source: Based on estimated regression  equations 
for  sample fishing units. 
Notes: 
AC  = average cost  (BDT); 
q  = catch  (kg). 
Source: Computed at  the  average rate of 
catch per  season and  based on equations 
in Table 4.2. 
Notes: 
AC  = average cost (BDT); 
Q  = catch ('000 kg). Market Submodel 
Market Demand Equations and Data 
In estimating the  market demand models with the use of the specified choices of 
variables  in equations (45) to  (47) an initial problem of  data availability was 
encountered.  First the complete absence of  series and wholesale  prices of different 
species of  fish led to the dropping of  the wholesale demand function from estimation. 
Price-quantity data on ex-vessel and retail levels were  available only as monthly series 
for the period covering July  1983 -  September 1987 mainly from published and 
unpublished records of  the  Bangladesh Fisheries Resource Survey System (BFRSS) in 
the  Department of  Fisheries and the published Monthly Statistical Bulletin of  Bangladesh 
Bureau of  Statistics  (BBS 1984,  1985, 1986). The Department of  Fisheries has available 
districtwise  monthly records of  ex-vessel landed quantities of  fish from rivers by major 
species and their values. The  Bangladesh Bureau of  Statistics publishes monthly retail 
prices of  important species of  fish in selected districts.  Monthly estimates of  both ex- 
vessel and retail demand models were made based on districts. 
With the time-frame  of  demand estimates being reduced to months, the use of  size 
of  population as a possible explanatory variable became less important, while the 
personal income data by month were  unavailable from published statistical sources. 
Since prices are nominal prices they have been deflated by the index of  monthly 
consumer food price index (CPI) in the absence of  an index of  inflation.  In a similar 
manner, catch quantities have been deseasonalized using a seasonal  index in 
estimating retail demand equations. 
Considering the data limitations and the above qualifications,  retail and ex-vessel 
demand models were estimated for the six species groups. 
For retail demand,  a single market was assumed for each species (equation (50)). 
The variable list includes price of the species to be modelled as the dependent variable 
and its quantity  and prices of  all other groups as well as prices of  chicken and beef as 
independent variables.  The provision for a structurally different  market between wet and 
dry seasons has been kept in the model through the inclusion of a dummy variable as 
one of the explanatory variables.  In the case of big prawn the prices depend 
exogenously on the international market price. As such, their domestic retail price has 
been assumed to correspond to the export price and hence dropped from estimation in 
terms of a structural equation. 
Significant structural differences over geographic regions and fishing seasons were 
explicitly  considered in the case of the ex-vessel market [equation (51)l.  Three regions 
(A,  B and C) were defined for the ex-vessel market for each species.  Catch quantities 
in Region A include the harvest from other rivers in the southeast and northeast 
Bangladesh and the Upper Meghna River; in Region B harvests include those from the 
lower Meghna River,  Lower Padma River and other rivers in the southwestern part of 
Bangladesh; and in Region C they include the harvest from the  Upper Padma River, 
Jamuna-Brahmaputra  River and other rivers in northwestern Bangladesh. While separate 
functions were  estimated for  each region, seasonal differences  in the price relations 
were explained with the help of  a dummy variable.  However, in the case of large 
prawns, only one ex-vessel market was assumed. 
In the ex-vessel market model for a species in a particular  region the variables 
included as explanatory variaMes were the region's ex-vessel quantity of the modelled 
species groups,  ex-vessel prices of  other groups  in the region, ex-vessel prices of the 
various species groups in other regions, and retail prices of  other species groups and 
other products. To  model ex-vessel market for  large prawns, their export price in the international market was considered most important in addition to  its ex-vessel price. 
However, in the  absence of  a time series on export price, FOB (freight on board) 
values of  prawn and shrimp were  used as a proxy variable. 
Retail market:  Pi = F(Q,, Pwi)  ...  50) 
where 
Pi  = retail prices of  fish and other  animal proteins; 
Qi  = retail quantity of ith  species; 
P-,  = retail prices of  cross products (fish and other  animal protein; 
Px  = ex-vessel price of  ith  species in jth region; 
Qx  = ex-vessel quantity of ith  species in the jth region; 
Px-  = ex-vessel prices of  other species in jth region; 
Px.  = ex-vessel prices of  all species in other  regions; 
D  = dummy variable; 
=  1 for dry months: October-March 
= 0 for wet  months: April-September 
i  = fish and animal protein (1, 2, .., 8) 
1 = hilsa, 2 = carp, 3 = catfish, 4 = small prawns, 5 = miscellaneous fish, 6= 
beef, 7 = chicken, 8 = large prawns 
j  = region (1, 2,  3) 
1 = Region A, 2 = Region B, 3 = Region C. 
Data Evaluation 
The statistical characteristics of  the raw data and their  transformed version  may give 
rise to some potential biases and distortions open for questions and challenges. Some 
of  the transformations  and the potential biases in the data are discussed below: 
First, the  retail quantity data were the monthly amount produced -  not consumed. 
Inventory adjustments, reductions due to  postharvest processing and spoilage  of 
production during postharvest handling in the course of  marketing in the final  retail 
market were  not considered to  correct for  any difference in production and consumption. 
However, the  resulting biases would still be considered minimum given the fact that 
most of  the fishes  harvested from the  riverine environment are consumed fresh without 
much processing and product transformations. 
Second, the quantity  measures for  each species were  not ideal. They assume 
homogeneity within each fish  species since quantity is defined in tonnes. Clearly, 
different sizes of  fish that led to  price differentials were  not captured in the ex-vessel 
quantity  and its value. Gates (1974) and DeVoretz (1982) cast serious doubt on  such 
measures of  quantity, and the former (Gates) opines that the same levels of landings in 
weight terms are associated with two equilibrium prices: one price for  large fish and a 
lower price for small fish. 
Third, the choice of  substitute price for  each species was  arbitrary in the  absence of 
a predetermined criterion.  However, with respect to other substitute fish an arbitrary 
choice will  not result in significant bias since consumers are largely indifferent in their 
preference and choice of  fish.  But the same may not be true with  respect to  choice 
between beef and poultry as substitute for  each species.  Fortunately, the price of beef 
has a direct bearing with imported livestock through informal trade  in addition to domestic  beef production. This phenomenon might have introduced a bias in the price 
of  beef  and hence its inclusion as an explanatory variable might give  less useful 
results. Considering this fact, and the  presence of  a high correlation  between the  beef 
price and poultry price we  used poultry price as one of  the explanatory  variables  in the 
final specification of  retail demand models that were used for estimation. 
Fourth, all prices,  retail as well  as ex-vessel, were deflated by the CPI. The biases 
resulting from such computation  are also expected to be minimal. 
Finally, the  absence of  an income variable  in the  model will introduce a bias in the 
estimates of  flexibility  (elasticity) coefficients for  both own and cross prices,  and, 
therefore,  make the  model less powerful for price (demand) forecasts. 
Since the  models are multivariate  in nature they were  a significant  source  of 
multicollinearity, one  of  the frequently  encountered problems in econometric  estimation 
of  statistical models with  multiple explanatory variables.  Under this circumstance  only  a 
few among the  listed variables  in equations  (50) and (51) were used in the final 
estimation  keeping in mind the  goodness of  fit, level of  significance  of  the  model and 
its parameter estimates including the signs  in each case. The rest of  the variables were 
dropped from the  specification  of  the  models. 
Similarly,  the seasonal dummy variable  'Dl was also dropped from the specifications 
of those  models where  it appeared least important and/or became an additional source 
of multi-collinearity as well  as distortion  of  expected signs, and a loss of  goodness of  fit 
and significance of  the  key variable  (quantity) and the  model itself. 
Estimation and Results 
The  model has been cast as a single  equation price dependent and supply 
independent. Therefore, the  OLS method was chosen to fit a  natural linear functional 
form and estimated. The natural linear functional  form was  estimated consistent with the 
main objective  of  its formulation,  i.e.,  to  provide an appropriate  price mechanism in the 
programming model that can  handle only  linear demand specifications.  The use of 
single  equation model with  OLS technique was  found to be more practical in a number 
of instances and hence, it has been used and advocated by some authors,  e.g.,  Labys 
(1  973), Wang (1976), DeVoretz (1982), Wang et al. (1986) and Cook and Copes 
(1  987). 
It should be mentioned here that  DeVoretz (1982)  made a comparison  between the 
parameter estimates of  single equation price-dependent models and those  of  single 
equation quantity dependent and simultaneous  equation models.  His findings show that 
price dependent  models are superior to  their counterpart  (quantity-dependent models). 
Also,  between the  OLS estimates  of  a price-dependent model and two  SLS (two stage 
least square) estimates  of  simultaneous  equation  model, the former was  found to  yield 
best fit with  little associated time series problems, whereas  the  latter yielded poor 
overall fit with some variables with either wrong sign or being insignificant. 
The problem of  autocorrelation  and moving average  errors also became significant 
for  certain specifications.  Under such circumstances  attempts were made to  correct 
them through  a respecification.  However, since such problems became  unavoidable the 
familiar  Box-Jenkin technique  or ARlMA  was  applied to overcome the  problem. 
The empirical results of  the  market models for each species at both retail and ex- 
vessel  level are presented in Tables 4.4  and 4.5,  respectively. As shown in Table 4.4, 
in the  case of  retail demand the  specifications  have high explanatory power  and are 
free  from autocorrelation. The  adjusted  R2 ranges between 0.70  in the case  of  hilsa 
and 0.91  in the  case  of  carp.  The  D-W are significant  at 5% for  all cases. The  F 
values are significant  at  1% level of  significance.  The coefficients  of  the  explanatory Table 4.4. Estimates of monthly retail demand models for various species harvested from the rivers of Bangladesh. 














Pi = retail price per  kg of  species; 
Qi = quantity  sold in thousand kg; 
i =  1,2,3,4,5,7 where  1 = hilsa, 2 = carp.  3 = catfish, 4 = small prawns, 5 - miscellaneous fish and 7 = poultry. 
significant at  10%. 
"  significant  at 5%. 
*** significant  at  1%. 
Table 4.5. Estimates of monthly ex-vessel demand models for various species harvested from the rivers of Bangladesh. 
Species  Equation  R'  D-W  F 
Hilsa 
P1.l  =  1.80  - 0.0017Ql.l  +  0.54P1.2  +  0.31P5  +  2.2501 
(0.25)  (-  1.24)  (3.47)"'  (1  .30)  (1.32) 
P1.2  =  -1.10  -O.OOOl9Ql.2 +  0.41Pl.l 
(-2.8)  (-2.35)"  (3.71)"' 
+0.34P1.3+  0.12P1  + 0.032P3.2  + 0.46P5.2 
(1.96)'  (0.86)  (0.33)  (0.26) 
P1.3  =  5.63  - 0.0024Q1.3  =  0.36P1.2  + 0.049P5  +  0.30P1 
(0.89)  (-0.78)  (2.42)"  (0.20)  (1.69) 
Carp 
P2.1 =  29.9  -0.0064Q2.1 +0.09P2.2  +0.14P3.1  -  3.76D 
(6.89)"'  (-2.48)"'  (0.79)  (0.96)  (2.75)"' 
P2.2  =  -7.15  -  0.024Q2.1  + 0.23P2.3  +  0.55P2  +0.12P4.2 
(0.54)  (- 1.12)  (2.26)"  (2.24)"  (0.69) 
P2.3  =  5.33  -  0.04Q2.3  + 0.24P2.1  + 0.54P2.2  +0.27P4.3 
(0.59)  (2.28)"  (2.04)"  (3.83)"'  (2.1  7)" 
Catfish 
P3.1  =  -0.73  - 0.002703.1  +  0.21P3.3  +  0.25P5  +0.15P4.3  +  0.19P4 
(-0.13)  (-0.65)  (1.76)'  (1.38)  (1.86)'  (2.1  3)" 
P3.2 =  10.25  -  0.008Q3.2  + O.079P3.3  0.58P5.2  +  4.64D1 
(1.71).  (-1.87).  (0.44)  (2.84)"'  (2.56)"' 
P3.3 =  9.32  -  0.012Q3.3  +  0.1P3.2  + 0.25P5.3 +  0.39P1 
(2.49)  (-1.85)*  (1  .OO)  (1.41)  (3.00)"' 
Small prawns 
P4.1 =  16.97  - 0.0042Q4.1  +  0.12P4.2  +  0.21P1  +  2.54D1 
(1.53)  (-2.39)"  (1.13)  (0.76)  (1  .08) 
P4.2  =  4.68  -0.006904.2  +0.18P4.1  +  0.35P2 
(0.67)  (-4.45)"'  (1.66)'  (2.93)"' 
P4.3 =  -14.85  -  0.097Q4.3  +  0.1 P4.2  +  0.74P2  +  0.16P1 
(-1.70)  (-2.69)"'  (0.49)  (3.75)"'  (0.83) 
continued Table 4.5  continued 
Species  Equation  R~  D-W  F 
Miscellaneous fish 
P5.1 =  13.15  -0.0019Q5.1  +  0.2P5  +  0.11P1 
(2.45)'*'  (-4.21)"'  (1.10)  (1.55) 
P5.2 =  -3.91  -  0.001Q5.2  +  0.49P5  + 0.47P1.2  -  2.12D1 
(-0.55)  (-2.09)"  (2.1  1  )***  (3.38)"'  (-1  59) 
P5.3  =  1.91  -0.0037Q5.3  +  0.63P5  +0.037P3.3 
(0.25)  (-2.87)"'  (2.72)***  (0.35) 
Large  prawns 
P8.0  =  106.00  -  0.037Q8.0  +0.00006FOB  +  1.04P4 
(3.33)'"'  (-4.40)""  (1.74)"  (1.11) 
Notes: 
"'  significant  at  1% 
** significant  at 5% 
significant at  10% 
Pi  =  retail pricelkg; 
Pi  j  =  ex-vessel pricelkg; 
Q  =  quantity sold in thousand  kg; 
i  =  1, 2,  ...,  8 where (1 = hilsa, 2  = carp, 3 = catfish, 4 = small prawns, 5 = miscellaneous  fish, 6  = beef, 
7 = poultry, 8 =  large  prawns); 
j  =  0,  1, 2,  3 where  (0 = all region, 1 = region A,  2 = region B and 3  =  region C); and 
FOB  =  export value  of  large prawns and shrimp. 
Table 4.6. Price flexibility coefficients for retail demand parameters 
of various riverine species in Bangladesh. 
Cross prices 
Species  Own price 
Hilsa  Carp  Misc.  Poultry 
Hilsa  0.06  1.00  0.24 
Carp  0.08  0.49  0.1  5 
Catfish  0.007  0.39  0.64 
Small prawns  0.05  0.49  0.42 
Miscellaneous  fish  0.02  0.18  0.71 
variables  have correct signs, i.e.,  negative for  its own quantity and positive for all 
substitute prices, and most of  the parameter estimates are significant. 
As  for the ex-vessel demands (Table 4.5)  the explanatory powers are,  in general, 
poorer than their  counterparts  of  the retail market, the  R2 values being in the range of 
0.49  and 0.71.  However, the models themselves and most of  the parameters are 
significant, with proper signs.  The D-W values are also significant at the 5%  level of 
significance. 
The  economic  parameters e.g.,  price flexibilty  coefficients have biased implications 
for the markets for  various species of  fish and their production  in the absence of an 
income variable in the present models. Nevertheless,  these  measures are a useful 
indicator of  relative movements in the sales revenue of  both retailers and producers 
(fishers) of  different species groups of  fish  in different  regions of  the country. The Table 4.7.  Price flexibility coefficients for ex-vessel demand 
parameters of  various  riverine species  in Bangladesh. 
Own price 
Species 
Dry season  Wet season  All season 
Hilsa 
-  Region A  0.0037  0.05 
-  Region B  0.07 
-  Region C  0.02 
Carp 
-  Region A  0.03  0.02 
-  Region B  0.02 
-  Region C  0.08 
Catfish 
-  Region A  0.03 
-  Region B  0.03  0.04 
-  Region C  0.06 
Small  prawns 
-  Region A  0.04  0.1 
-  Region B  0.16 
-  Region C  0.13 
Miscellaneous fish 
-  Region A  0.36 
-  Region B  0.05  0.05 
-  Region C  0.14 
Large prawns  0.09 
values  of such parameters generated at the mean values of  the sample data are 
summarized  in Tables 4.6  and 4.7. 
The demand for  all the fish species is highly price inflexible in all markets for all 
species of fish (Tables 4.6  and 4.7).  This implies that if there has been an increase in 
the supply, for  instance through better management, there will be an increase in the 
sales revenue in both markets (retail and ex-vessel). 
However, the degree of  inflexibility differs among individual species as well as from 
market to market and region to region. This implies that there will be a differential 
effect on the sales revenue of  the traders depending on the market level, species type 
and regions of fish production and trade, for a given change in the supply.  For 
instance,  in the  retail market the positive revenue impact of  an  increased supply will be 
the  largest for  catfish (the price flexibility  coefficient being the lowest at 0.007)  and 
smallest for  carp (the price flexibility  coefficient being the highest at 0.08).  Similarly, in 
the ex-vessel market such impact will be highest for the dry-season hilsa market in 
Region A and lowest for  miscellaneous fish market in Region A  (see Table 4.7). 
Although  in general ex-vessel prices are expected to be more flexible than the retail 
prices, the coefficients  of  price flexibility  at the ex-vessel market of  certain fish in 
certain regions are  lower than that of the corresponding retail market. 
In Tables 4.8  and 4.9 the retail and ex-vessel demand functions  have been reduced 
to  equations in terms of  their own quantities.  Since price of substitutes  acted as shift 
variables in the demand models their average values were  incorporated to  compute the 
equations  in Tables 4.8  and 4.9. These equations were  used as functional  parameters Table 4.8.  Monthly retail demand equations for various species landed from  rivers of  Bangladesh. 
Species  Equation 
Mean value of  sample variables 
(S.D.) 
Hilsa 
N = 50 
Carp 
N = 50 
Catfish 
N = 50 
Small 
prawns 
N = 50 
Miscellaneous 
fish 
N = 50 
Source: Computed at the mean value of the sample shift variables. 
Notes: 
Pi = retail price (i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7) of hilsa, carp, catfish, small prawns, miscellaneous fish and poultry, 
respectively. 
Qi = retail quantity (i  = 1,2,  ..., 5) of hilsa, carp, catfish, small prawns and miscellaneous  fish, respectively. 
Table4.9. Monthly ex-vessel  demand equations  for various species harvested from the rivers of Bangladesh. 
Mean value of  sample variables 
Species  Equations  (S.D.) 
Hilsa 
P1.l  = 20.86  -0.0017Q1.1  +  2.25D 
N=33 
Carp 
P2.1  = 35.86  -0.0064Q2.1  -  3.76D 
N=32 
continued Table 4.9. (Continued) 
Species  Equations 
Mean value of sample variables 
(S.D.) 
Catfish 
P3.1 = 21.35  -0.0027Q3.1 
N=33 
Small prawns 
P4.1 = 30.93  -0.0042Q4.1  +  2.54D 
N=32 
Miscellaneous fish 
P5.1 = 21.53  -0.0019Q5.1 
N=32 
Large prawns 
P8.0 =I51  -0.037Q8.0 
N=27 
(28.0  =374 
(417) 
FOB  =146,527 
(109,634) 
Source: Computed at the mean value of the sample shift variables. 
Notes: 
D  = seasonal dummy variable  (=  1 for dry season, = 0 otherwise). 
Pi  = retail pricelkg; 
Pi.j  = ex-vessel pricelkg; 
Q  = quantity sold in thousand kg; 
1  = 1, 2,  ..., 8 where (1 = hilsa, 2 = carp, 3 = catfish, 4 = small prawns, 5 = miscellaneous fish, 
6 = beef, 7 = poultry, 8 = large prawns); 
j  = 0, 1, 2, 3 where. (0 = all region,  1 = region A, 2 = region B and 3 = region C); and 
FOB  = export value of  large prawns and shrimp. in the programming model solved in Chapter 5. The retail demand equations in Table 
4.8 yield the revenue and benefit functions of  the programming model. 
The difference  between the retail price and ex-vessel price is treated as the margin 
of the fish trading sector  (postharvest operators) from the point of  ex-vessel trade to 
the  retail sales.  Under a perfectly competitive market this difference  (margin) represents 
traders'  (postharvest operators')  nominal cost of  transporting,  handling, processing and 
marketing activities,  and normal returns on trading capital as well as profits (payments) 
to  their  labor and enterpreneurial skills  (Tomek and Robinson 1981). Therefore, the 
margins of  the trading sector can be treated as the opportunity cost of postharvest 
handling, hence they constitute part of  the social cost in the fisheries production 
process. Table 39  - Appendix A shows the equations of  post-harvest cost (market 
margin) for different species produced from the rivers in different regions of  the country, 
which  have been derived as the difference between retail and ex-vessel prices shown in 
Tables 4.4 and 4.5, respectively. Table 5.2.  Distribution of catch (t) of various species and level of effort (gear hours x  lo6) 
in the Base Model for riverine fisheries of  Bangladesh by  river group. 
River 1  River 2  River 3  River 4 
(Meghna)  (Padma)  (Jamuna-  (Others) 




































'Approximate  levels based on sample survey by the author, and survey of fishing units by 
DOF (unpubl. data). 
b~ctual  average  annual catch during 1983-84 to 1986-87 (Source: DOF, unpubl. data). 
Considering the year to year fluctuation of  catch  (Table 2.2),  the  model results 
(Table 5.2)  can be considered as a reasonable approximation to the current exploitation 
intensity  of the various species groups.  Therefore,  the structure of  the  Base Model can 
be used as  a tool to simulate the behavior of  the  riverine fisheries of  Bangladesh with 
respect to effort allocation,  fish  production and benefit generation to the society in an 
economically efficient  manner. 
In terms of  fishing effort, the total amount of  fish  (173,163 t)  per annum  noted 
above requires 197,054 gear hours x  106 of fishing operations.  Of  these,  hilsa alone Hilsa  Prawn  Catfish  Carp  Misc. 
Base  Model  Official statistics  I 
Fig.  5.1. Comparison  of  Base  Model landings and 
official landings from the rivers of Bangladesh, 1983- 
84  to  1986-87.  A.  by  species  groups;  8. by  river 
groups. 
Meghna  Padm  Jornuna-  Other 
Brahrnaputra  rivers 
requires 54% (Table 5.1).  The aggregate CPUE (catchigear hour x  lo6) is 879  kg. 
However, the CPUE expressed as the ratio of  direct catch to total effort is the  highest 
(895 kgigear hour x  lo6) for the miscellaneous group fishery  and lowest for carp (420 
kgigear hour x  106). 
Again,  as shown in Table 5.2  most of  the effort is allocated  in River 1 (Meghna) 
and River 4  (Other rivers) (48% and 45%,  respectively). Thus,  River 2  (Padma) and 
River 3  (Jamuna-Brahmaputra)  employ only 7% of  the total effort.  River 4  (Other rivers) 
has the  highest catch per unit of  effort (1,091  kgigear hour x  106). 
Given the  available statistics on the total number of  fishing  units (Table 34 - 
Appendix  A)  operating in the riverine fisheries  of  Bangladesh and based on the  average 
size of  fishing gear  and amount of  fishing time  per fishing  unit (Tables 46 and 47 - 
Appendix  A),  the  current actual annual level of  effort is roughly 430,304 gear  hours x 
lo6,  which  is about  118% higher than the level of  effort shown by the  result of the 
Base Model. Compared to the current average catch level of  198,000 t.year-' the 
existing level of  effort is, therefore,  much in excess of  what  is economically  desirable to 
produce the  similar  amount of  catch. 
As for  individual rivers, shown in Table 5.2,  the size of  current effort is higher by 
136% in River  1 (Meghna), 247% in River 2  (Padma),  140% in River 3  (Jamuna- 
Brahmaputra) and 87%  in River 4  (Other rivers). This shows that the  principal rivers, 
especially,  the  Padma River, have a relatively higher pressure of  excess capacity than 
the  Other rivers. Table 5.3.  Regional share of total landings and postharvest cost in the  Base Model for  riverine 
fisheries of Bangladesh. 
Species 
Reg. A  Reg. B  Reg. C 












-cost per landed kg (BDT) 
Catfish 
-landings  (t) 
-postharvest costa 












-cost per landed kg (BDT) 
- 
aln million Bangladesh Taka (US$l = BDT32). 
b~igure  shows column total only. 
Total cost of  harvest and postharvest activities  is BDT4,083  million, which  is 77% of 
the gross revenue. Again,  of  the total cost, 57% represents cost of fishing effort 
(harvest cost). The remaining 43% (BDT2,435  million) represents market margin or the 
cost of  postharvest handling, processing and transporting  of fish and fish products. 
Market margins vary widely  among species groups. As  shown in Table 5.1,  postharvest 
cost (representing margins), is as high as 43% of  retail price in the case of  small 
prawns and as low as  19% of  export price in the case of  large prawns. 
Moreover, the structure of postharvest cost is different  in various regions of  the 
country for each species group. Table 5.3  shows the distribution of  catch by region and 
corrssponding cost of  postharvest handling and marketing. Region A presents the 
highest average postharvest cost (BDT13Jkg) as compared to the other two regions 
( BDTSJkg). 
The cost of  postharvest handling has a distributive  implication on the benefits 
generated  in the fisheries production process. The value of  postharvest cost margins 
(shown in Tables 5.1  and 5.3)  has been defined as the actual input cost 
(transportation, ice,  labor, packing materials, etc.),  plus the opportunity cost of  capital 
and managerial skill.  In the actual conduct of postharvest activities the operators incur a relatively lesser cost in terms of actual input cost as compared to the opportunity  cost 
of  capital and enterpreneurship.  Less than a third of the total market margin is 
accounted for by the actual inputs (Ahmed 1983; FAOIRapport 1986). 
Again, given that 43% of  the total cost represents market margin for the non-primary 
producers (traders) at the postharvest level, (33% of  the consumer price) and 
considering that only a minimal amount of  processing and product improvement is 
required, the gain of the non-primary producers is very significant.  Producers (traders) 
at the secondary  and tertiary  levels of  production are able to  realize a larger pure profit 
or  have a higher opportunity cost of  their capital and labor than the primary producers 
(fishermen). 
Sensitivity Analysis 
Variation of Effort and Model Response 
As  mentioned earlier, the  Base Model was solved without  any prior restriction on the 
availability  of  effort.  However, responses of  the  model to varying levels of  effort would 
be useful to check its performance and consistency.  More importantly, such exercise will 
allow us to  identify values along paths of  movements of shadow prices and other 
economic variables  (e.g.,  catch, benefit, cost and price) for each of  the individual 
fisheries  as well as their aggregate. 
Two types of  variations  in the availability of  effort are examined. First, variations  in 
the availability of  aggregate effort in the  Base Model are examined without  any 
restriction on the allocation  among various fisheries (species) and/or fishing grounds 
(river groups). This is assuming the flexibility  characterizing effort allocation among 
species and fishing grounds. Thus,  availability  of aggregate effort in the base model is 
allowed to vary from zero to nonbinding levels. 
Table 5.4. Aggregate values of different variables at various levels of total effort in the Base Model for riverine 
fisheries of Bangladesh. 
Level of total effort 











Total catch (t)  36,709 
-direct catch  28,380 
-by-catch  8,329 
Total effort 
(gear hours x  lo6)  20,000 
Catch per effort (kglgear 
hour x  lo6)  1,835 
Shadow price of effort 
(BDTlgear hour x  lo3)  17.64 
aln million Bangladesh Taka (US$l = BDT32). A  summary of results showing aggregate values of  different variables at various 
levels of  effort availability  is shown in Table 5.4.  A breakdown of the results for 
fisheries by species groups is shown in Table 48 - Appendix A.  Fig. 5.2  shows the plot 
of aggregate catch and CPUE presented in Table 5.4.  The curve of aggregate catch in 
Fig. 5.2  shows how catch would change as effort changes. The shape of the total 
catch curve shows that as effort increases, catch also increases but at a decreasing 
rate. This is consistent with the theoretical postulate that as more and more effort is 
exerted to  a given level of  stock, the marginal productivity of  each additional effort, 
ceteris paribus, decreases, because of  crowding externalities and vessel congestion 
relative to the availability  of  stock. Thus, CPUE also declines, as shown by the 
downward sloping curve in Fig. 5.2). 
The plot of benefit and cost (harvest and postharvest cost) with effort and catch is 
shown in Figs. 5.3 and 5.4,  respectively. The net benefit curve, defined as the 
difference between gross benefit and total cost in Figs. 5.3  and 5.4  increases at a 
decreasing rate and finally flattening out at  197,054 gear hours x  1  O6 of effort and 
173,163 t of catch. This suggests that additional  units of  effort beyond 197,054 gear 
hours x  106  will not increase the net benefit.  In other words, the opportunity cost of 
effort becomes zero for this level of effort and output.  In terms of the programming 
model this implies that the dual activity of effort will have a zero value reflecting a 
Effort (gear hours x 109)  Catch (t  x  lo3) 
Fig. 5.2. Aggregate catch and effort relationships in the  Fig. 5.3. Benefit. cost and effort relationships in the Base 
Net benefit 
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Effort (gear hours x lo9)  Effort (gear hours x  109) 
Fig. 5.4.  hef fit, cost and catch relationships in the Base  Fig. 5.5. Shadow prices of  effort in the Base Model. 
Model. redundant character of the effort constraint beyond this limit. This is evident from Table 
5.4 which  also shows the shadow prices at various levels of aggregate effort. Fig. 5.5 
shows the downward sloping curve for shadow prices of  aggregate effort, signifying  a 
diminishing  contribution  of  effort at higher levels of  its application to a given fish stock. 
Additionally  (but this cannot be shown throughout this model), increased effort would 
increase the probability  of recruitment failure, a biological consideration not discussed 
here. 
Second, variations  in the availability  of  effort are examined with prior restrictions on 
the allocation to each individual fishery. Thus, assuming fixed allocation of  effort for 
each fishery the availability  of  such effort designated to each fishery  (species groups)  is 
allowed to vary from zero to  nonbinding levels. There are, however, no prior bindings 
on allocation of  effort among fishing grounds (rivers). This is considering that  effort 
could be fishery-specific but flexible to operate in different fishing grounds. The 
implication of  this case for  management is that if fishing effort is allowed to  move 
across species and fishing grounds and reallocation cost is minimal it would be 
profitable from a societal  point of  view to  reallocate effort among species and fishing 
grounds  until their shadow prices become equal. The results of  the  Base Model with 
unrestricted effort allocation show the optimal size of  effort for each species  in each 
river (Table 5.1). 
Six different levels of effort allocation to each fishery were  examined (Table 5.5). 
Figs. 5.6 and 5.7 show the total catch and CPUE for each fishery  at various  levels of 
effort. Total catch as well  as CPUE is highest for the miscellaneous species fishery and 
lowest for the carp fishery  for identical level of  effort allocation to each fishery.  For 
instance, at a level of 8,000  gear hours x  106 of  effort available to each fishery the 
CPUE for the miscellaneous fishery  is as high as  1,775 kglgear hour x  106 while that 
for carp fishery is only 486 kglgear hour x  lo6. 
50- 
o  Prawn 
I  Effort (gear hours x 10') 
Fig. 5.6. Catch and  effort relationships for individual groups in the Base 
Model. 
The shadow prices of  effort for each fishery  are shown in Table 5.6  and Fig. 5.8.  At 
a lower level of  effort equal to 4,000  gear  hours x  106 per fishery the shadow price of 
effort (gear hours x  lo9) for the miscellaneous fishery  is the  highest (BDT28.9  x  lo6) 
followed  by hilsa (BDT15.6 x  lo6), prawn (BDT14.7 x  106), catfish (BDT13.8  x  lo6) and 
carp (BDT8.9 x  106). This implies that an additional unit of  effort will yield the largest 
contribution to the net benefit if  it is allocated to the carp fishery. As  effort expands 
successively to each fishery, the shadow prices for each fishery diminishes.  However, 0.2 1 
carp 
0'  I  I  I  I 
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Effort (gear hours x lo9) 
Fig. 5.7. CPUE and effort relationships for  various groups in the Base 
Model. 
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Fig. 5.8. Shadow prices of  effort for  various fisheries in the rivers of  Bangladesh. 
as seen  in Fig. 5.8,  although shadow prices diminish with increments in the level of 
effort the relative declines are different.  Thus,  at a higher level of  effort equal to 24,000 
gear hours x  lo6, hilsa exceeds miscellaneous fish in terms of  shadow price of  effort 
(gear hours x  lo9), the values being 7.34  and 5.95  million BDT, respectively. The 
shadow price for all other species are zero at 24,000 gear hours x  106 of effort 
available to each fishery. This signifies that if effort were  increased above this figure, it 
would be a more rational choice to employ this to the hilsa fishery than to others, since 
extra effort contributes most to the net benefit when allocated to hilsa fishery.  In fact, 
hilsa and miscellaneous fish have a positive shadow price for a wider  range of effort 
than prawn, catfish and carp,  implying the relatively gredter capability  of absorbing effort 
with positive net benefits. 
Comparing the  results of the first case where effort can move freely among fisheries 
with those of the second case in which effort allocation is fishery specific,  it is observed Table 5.5. Changes in effort (gear hours x lo6)  availability for each fishery in the Base Model for riverine fisheries of Bangladesh. 
Items 
Species  Species 











Totai catch (I) 
- direct catch 
-  by-catch 
Total effortb (hours) 
Catch per effortC  (kg) 
Price and unit cost 





Species  Species 
Hilsa  Misc.  Prawn  Catfish  Caro  All  Hilsa  Misc.  Prawn  Catfish 
~enefit-costa 
Net benefit  25  1  460 
Gross benefit  518  1.007  . 
Producer surplus  24  8  455 
Consumer surplus  3  5 
Total revenue  515  1.002 
Total cost  266  547 
-Harvest cost  139  182 
-Postharvest cost  128  365 
Catch-effort 
Total catch (I)  19,592  34.576 
-  d~rect  catch  15.530  21 -61  3 
-  by-catch  4.062  12.963 
Total effortb (hours)  16.000  16,000 
Catch per effortC (kg)  971  1.351 
Pr~ce  and unit cost (BDTrper kg) 
priced  26.27  28.97 
Harvest cost  7.09  5.25 
Postharvest cost  6.51  10.55 
Shadow ~rlce  7.94  9.23 








-  Harvest cost 
-  Postharvest cost 
 car^  All 
E = 32.000 
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Hilsa  Misc.  Prawn  Catfish  Carp  All 
Catch-effort 
Total catch (I)  33.972  49,118  17.733  9.399  6.937  117.159  39.957  54.186  17,854  9,471  7.001  128.469 
- d~rect  catch  27,041  33,369  14,310  8,280  5.755  88.755  32.370  38,344  14,070  8,280  5,754  98.818 
- by-catch  6,931  15.749  3.423  1.119  1,182  28.404  7.587  15.842  3,784  1.191  1,247  29.651 
Total effortb  32,000  32,000  18,285  9,831  13,673  105.789  40.000  40,000  17,529  9.831  13,675  121,035 
Catch per unlt 
of  effort lko\'  845  1.043  783  842  421  1.107  809  959  803  84  2  421  1,061 
continued Table 5.5  (continued) 
Species  Species 
Hilsa  Misc.  Prawn  Catfish  Carp  All  Hilsa  Misc.  Prawn  Catfish  Carp  All 
Price and unit cost (BDTIkg) 
priced  26.01  28.85  47.82  29.1 1  48.59  25.91  28.82  47.81  29.10  48.55 
Harvest cost  8.59  7.36  34.73  18.16  23.26  13.67  8.93  8.39  33.37  18.02  23.05  13.54 
Postharvest  cost  6.54  11.30  22.27  6.65  16.52  11.52  6.54  11.63  22.21  6.65  16.51  11.42 
Shadow price  5.25  1.97  0  0  0 
million Bangladgsh Taka (US$l = BDT32). 
gear  hours x  10 . 
'~atio  of  direct catch to total effort. 
d~s  for prawn price indicates that of only small prawns; price of large prawns is fixed at BDT177lkg. 
Table 5.6. Shadow prices of effort for various fisheries (Dual 
value in million BDT). 
Available effort  Shadow price 
in each fishery  (gear hours x  10') 
(gear hours 
x  lo6)  Hilsa  Prawn  Catfish  Carp  Misc. 
Level of effort 
at which Dual value 
becomes 
zero  11  1,321 
that a nonspecific effort allocation can bring higher net benefit to the society and a 
larger  catch per unit of  effort at all levels of  effort availability. This is because, given 
that  efforts are flexible,  a nonspecific effort allocation would make interspecies allocation 
of  effort in such a way that efforts will move from fisheries with lower shadow prices to 
fisheries with higher shadow prices. The process will continue until shadow  prices in all 
fisheries become equal.  For instance, as seen in Tables 5.5  and 5.6,  when a total of 
20,000 gear  hours x  106 of  effort are specified to be allocated equally among five 
existing fisheries, the shadow price of  effort (expressed in gear hours x  lo9)  for the 
miscellaneous fishery  is the highest (BDT28.88  million) while  that for carp is the  lowest 
(BDT8.86  million). On the other hand, as shown in Table 5.4,  when the same effort  is 
made  unrestricted, the interspecies allocation will equate  the shadow price of  effort 
(gear hours x  lo9)  to  BDT17.64  million for all fisheries,  making the  highest allocation to 
the  miscellaneous fishery (7,274 gear  hours x  lo6)  and the lowest allocation for carp 
(988 gear  hours x  1  06). 
Here again,  it must be stressed that  the increase of  effort directed, e.g.,  against 
hilsa could actually  lead to  a rapid drop of  catch and profits due to a failure of 
recruitment, an element not considered in the model. Table 5.7. Behavior of the riverine fisheries of Bangladesh under alternative cost conditions (changes in 
the cost of  harvesting from the Base Model). 
Condition of cost 
Items 
50%  25%  Base  25%  50%  100% 











Total catch ('000 kg)  305.65  230.06  173.16  130.23  96.58  54.13 
-direct catch  245.87  184.26  139.86  104.67  77.36  44.30 
-by-catch  59.77  45.80  33.31  25.56  19.22  9.83 
Total effort (hourslb483,363  303,101  197,054  131,493  84,671  38,787 
Catch per effort (kg/ 
gear hour x  lo6))  632  759  879  990  1,141  1,396 
aln million Bangladesh Taka (US$1 = BDT32). 
gear hours x  lo6. 
Simulation of Cost and Demand Changes 
and Implications for Policy 
In the supply-demand framework of the programming model, most of  the policy and 
factor changes will  affect the outcome through changes in the cost and price structure 
of the fisheries. Therefore,  in the following sections efforts have been made to analyze 
the  effects  of  changes in the cost and demand structure of the  Base Model in terms of 
behavior ol the fisheries.  Cost changes include shifts  in the harvesting cost, while 
demand changes include changes in the aggregate price. 
CHANGES IN THE COST OF HARVEST 
The structure  of  cost functions for  harvesting various species of  fish from the  rivers 
of Bangladesh was analyzed by performing systematic changes in the harvest cost 
functions  used in the  Base Model. Such changes were done in both directions  (increase 
and decrease) from the  level of  Base Model harvest-cost functions. 
Table 5.7 shows the aggregate results of  variations  of  cost of  harvesting in 
percentage terms of  the  Base Model costs. As  seen in Table 5.7  a 25% decrease  in 
the cost of  harvest would allow aggregate efforts in the riverine fisheries of  Bangladesh 
to  expand by 54%, theoretically  increasing the total landings by 33% and total net 
benefit by 63% from the levels shown by the resuits of the  Base Model. However, the 
net benefit accrued would contribute more (in terms of  percentage increase) to 
consumer surplus than to producer surplus. Thus, as a result of  a 25% decrease  in the 
cost condition of  harvest, consumer surplus would increase by more than 500% (an 
increase from  BDT94 million to  BDT607 million) while producer surplus would increase 
by only 25% (an increase from BDT1,289  million to  BDT1,653  million) from the Base 
Model levels. Table 5.10. Changes in the availability of effort for a 25% decrease in the cost of harvest from the Base Model 
for riverine fisheries of Bangladesh. 
Level of total effort 
(gear hours x  1  06) 
20,000  40,000  80,000  120,000  200,000  303,101  Items 











Total catch ('000 t)  37.35 
-direct catch  27.52 
-by-catch  9.84 
Total effortb  20,000 
Catch per unit of 
effort (kglgear hour x  lo6)  1,867 
Shadow price of effort 
(BDTlgear hour x  lo3)  20.99 
aln million Bangladesh Taka (US$l = BDT32). 
gear hours x  lo6. 
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Fig. 5.9. Catch and effort under alternative cost conditions.  Fig. 5.10. CPUE and effort under alternative cost conditions. 
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Fig. 5.11. Gross benefit and effort under alternative cost 
conditions. 
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Fig. 5.1 2. Cost and effort under alternative cost conditions. As  shown in Fig. 5.9  the movement of total landings at varying levels of  effort 
availability  under alternative  cost conditions follows a steady pattern. A higher amount 
of  total catch is predicted -  again under the assumption of  no stock-recruitment 
relationship - for higher levels of  effort with catch increasing at a diminishing  rate for all 
situations of cost. This  implies a downward sloping curve of  CPUE for all cost 
conditions, as shown in Fig. 5.10.  Furthermore, as observed in Fig. 5.9,  a higher total 
catch would be obtained at each given level of  effort when the cost condition 
decreases and vice versa. This results in an  increase in the CPUE when cost condition 
decreases and vice versa, particularly for  relatively higher level of  effort availability. 
Thus,  as shown in Fig. 5.10,  the CPUE curve would shift up for a decrease  in the 
condition of cost and vice versa. This situation  is equivalent to a stock change in a 
given fishing environment with  resultant change in the CPUE, and a change in the cost 
of  harvest. Therefore,  the simulation  of  alternative cost conditions of  harvest can as 
well be attribated to stock changes, with the resultant outcome being similar to cost 
changes. 
A similar pattern is observed in the case of  gross benefit and net benefit shown in 
Figs. 5.1 1 and 5.13,  respectively. Thus, gross revenue as well as net revenue would be 
higher for lower cost conditions for all levels of  effort availability  and vice versa. 
As for the cost of harvest (effort cost), shown in Fig. 5.12,  however, the movement 
is still steady but the relationship is positive. A lower total cost of effort is incurred at 
lower levels of cost conditions  and vice versa. This is because a change in the cost 
condition of harvest would also change the unit cost of effort proportionately. 
A  25% decreose 
25% increase 
Base Model  , 
I 
Effort (gear hours x  lo9) 
Fig. 5.13. Net benefit and effort relationships under alternative cost conditions. 
Also, when cost conditions change, the allocatim pattern of  effort across fisheries 
changes. This is evident from Table 5.1 1. The inter-species reallocation of  effort  under 
alternative  cost conditions would also produce differing effects on the pattern of 
landings of  each individual species.  For instance, for  hilsa higher catches are recorded 
at higher cost conditions, whereas for prawn, lower catches are recorded at higher cost 
conditions, for a given level of  aggregate effort (Table 5.11).  The implication of  such 
results is that if several interdependent fisheries are exploited by effort that is flexible to 
reallocation across fisheries,  changes in the condition of cost of harvest may change Table 5.1 1. Behavior of effort (gear hours x  lo6) use and landings (t) of individual species at various  levels of effort 
availability  and under alternative cost conditions. 
Available  Cost Condition 
level of 
effort  25% increase  25% decrease  Base Model 
(gear - 
hour8  Direct  By-  Total  Dlrecl  By-  Total  Direct  By-  Total 

































the effort allocation  and landings pattern of  individual fisheries, depending on the 
opportunity cost of  effort relative to the CPUE in each fishery. 
The shadow price of  effort for alternative cost conditions are shown in Table 5.12 
and plotted in Fig. 5.14.  It is seen from Table 5.12 that the shadow prices of effort are 
lower for a cost increase and higher for a cost decrease at a given level of  effort.  In 
A  25% decrease 
1  25% increase 
/  Base  Model 
Effort (gear hours x lo9 
Fig. 5.14. Shadow prices of  effort under alternative cost conditions. Table 5.1 2. Shadow prices (BDT  x 10'  per gear hour x lo9)  of effort 
under alternative conditions of cost of  harvest. 
Available  Cost condition 
effort 
(gear hours  25%  25%  Base 
x lo6)  increase  decrease  Model 
Level of  effort 
at which Dual value 
becomes zero  131,493  303,101  197,054 
terms of  Fig. 5.14  this implies that an increase in the cost condition of  harvest would 
shift the curve of  shadow price down and vice versa. The implication of  such 
movements of  shadow prices across different cost conditions are that each additional 
unit of  effort would result in a larger contribution to the  net benefit when applied to  a 
cost situation that is lower than the one assumed in the Base Model and vice versa. 
CHANGES IN AGGREGATE DEMAND 
Changes in the retail demand functions for various species of  fish were simulated by 
changing the intercepts of the functions.  Such changes imply changes in the aggregate 
demand attributable  to changes in the population,  real income, etc. The intercepts were 
shifted up and down by 10% and 20% from the  Base Model demand intercepts. 
Table 5.13  shows the aggregate outcome under alternative demand conditions. A 
decrease  in the aggregate demand would reduce the level of  effort while an increase in 
the aggregate demand would increase the level of  effort as compared to the  Base 
Model. The resultant effects on the landings (total catch), total cost and net benefit 
(producer and consumer surplus) would also be positive. As  seen in Table 5.13  a  10% 
decrease  in the aggregate demand for all fish species would decrease the  level of 
effort by 28% from the  Base Model level. This would reduce the total catch, total cost 
and net benefit by 20%, 26% and 32%, respectively. A  10% increase in the aggregate 
demand would increase the level of  effort by 26% from the  Base Model level. The 
model predicts that this would increase the total landings by 19%, total cost by 26% 
and total net benefits by 52%. Also since the level of  effort changes with the changes 
in the aggregate demand, the CPUE would also change. Accordingly, the CPUE for the 
operating fishing units would be higher for a decrease  in the aggregate demand and 
vice versa. 
As  for the individual fisheries,  the effects of  changes in the aggregate demand on 
total effort and total catch would also be positive (Table 52 -  Appendix A).  Effort use 
and landings would increase for all species  if  aggregate demand increases and vice 
versa.  However, relative effects of  a given change in aggregate demand would be 
different for  each fishery. Table 5.14 shows the catch (direct catch and by-catch), price 
and effort for individual fisheries  under alternative demand conditions. As  for effort use, 
a  decrease  in aggregate demand from the Base Model level would decrease the 
effort use in carp,  prawn and hilsa fisheries  by as much as 36%  32% and 30%, Table  5.13.  Behavior  of  different  riverine fisheries  of  Bangladesh  under alternative demand 




10%  Base 
increase  Model 
10%  20% 











Total catch (t)  232,045 
-direct catch  186,050 
-by-catch  45,995 
Total effortb (hours)  310,900 
Catch per effortC 
(kglgear hour x  lo6)  746 
"In  million Bangladesh Taka (US$l = BDT32). 
gear hours x  lo6. 
'Ratio  of total catch to total effort. 
Table 5.14.  Total catch, price and effort for individual species under alternative demand conditions. 
Demand condition 
-  -  - 
10%  Base  10% 
decrease  Model  increase 
Species  Catch  Price  Effort  Catch  Price  Effort  Catch  Price  Effort 
(t)  (BDTIkg)   hour^)^  (t)  (BDTlkg)  (hours)"  (1)  (BDTIkg)    hour^)^ 
Hilsa  59,816 
(52,930)~ 
PrawnC  12,946 
(9,560) 
Catfish  9,017 
(7,960) 
Carp  5,602 
(4,421 
Misc.  51,690 
(35.200) 
Total  139,072 
(1  10,071) 
gear hours x  lo6. 
b~igures  in parentheses indicate the direct catch. 
'Price  indicates that of small prawns only. 
respectively, whereas there would be no change in the effort in the catfish fishery  as 
compared to the effort levels for the respective fisheries  in the  Base Model. Again, a 
increase in aggregate demand would increase the effort in the prawn fishery,  for 
instance, by as high as 44%  whereas  there would be only  10% increase in the effort 
in the hilsa fishery. With  respect to catch as an outcome  of  effort use, particularly direct catch,  the 
response of  individual fisheries  is different for changes in aggregate demand. Thus,  as 
shown  in Table 5.14,  a  10% decrease  in aggregate demand would result in a decline of 
direct catch of  prawn, hilsa and carp by as much as 31°/0,  25% and 23%  respectively, 
whereas that of  catfish would remain unchanged at the  Base Modei level.  Similarly,  a 
10% increase in aggregate demand would increase the direct catch of  prawn, 
miscellaneous fish and carp by as much as 34%, 32% and 28% respectively, whereas 
that  of  hilsa and catfish would  only  increase by 6% and lo%, respectively. The 
behavior of  catch and effort to changes in aggregate demand, therefore, shows that 
prawn and carp fisheries are more sensitive to demand changes (in both directions), 
while  the  hilsa fishery is more sensitive for a decrease in aggregate demand. 
Also,  as expected, the equilibrium prices of  all species would increase when demand 
increases and vice versa.  Thus, as shown in Table 5.14,  a  10% decrease  in the 
aggregate demand would increase equilibrium price for  hilsa by lo%, while a 10% 
decrease  in the  aggregate demand would reduce that of  hilsa by 9.3%.  The effects on 
prices of  other groups  is similar  in magnitude, ranging between 8.6% and 10% for  both 
increase and decrease  in aggregate demand. 
The behavior of  the  riverine fisheries for various given levels of  effort under 
alternative demand conditions was also simulated through sensitivity analysis.  The 
outcomes for  each level of  effort  under alternative demand conditions show how the 
individual fisheries as well as their aggregate grow, responding to  alternative market 
(demand) conditions.  Effects of  10% changes from the  Base Model are shown in Tables 
5.15  and 5.16. 
The  movement of aggregate catch, CPUE and benefit (gross benefit) and cost of 
harvesting at varying levels of  available effort and under alternative demand xmditions 
are shown  in Figs. 5.15  to 5.18, respectively. At  lower levels of  effort, aggregate catch, 
Table 5.15. Changes in the availability of effort for  a 10% decrease in the aggregate 
demand from the Base Model for  riverine fisheries  of Bangladesh. 
Level of total effort 
(gear hours x  lo6) 











Total catch (t)  37,760 
-direct catch  28,026 
-by-catch  9,734 
Total effortb (hours)  20,000 
Catch per effortC 
(kglgear hour x  lo6)  1,888 
Shadow price of effort 
(BDTlgear hour x  lo3)  14.8 
aln million Bangladesh Taka (US$l = BDT32). 
gear hours x  lo6. 
'Ratio  of total catch to total effort. "  200- 
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Fig. 5.1  5.  Catchand effort under alternative demand conditions. 
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Fig. 5.16. CPUE and effort under alternativedemand  conditions. 
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Fig. 5.18.  Cost and effort under alternative  demand conditions. 
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CPUE and cost of harvesting show little or  no change under alternative demand 
conditions.  Gross benefits are higher for  higher levels of  aggregate demand and vice 
versa.  Consequently,  net benefits shown in Fig. 5.19  would be higher at higher levels 
of aggregate demand. This is due mainly to the higher levels of  equilibrium price 
showing  higher willingness  of  consumers to pay. 
The behavior of each fishery under two alternative demand conditions  (10% 
decrease  and increase) for varying levels of  effort availability  is shown in Tables 53 and 
54 -  Appendix A. 
The shadow prices of effort under alternative demand conditions are shown in Fig. 
5.20.  At a given level of  effort, the shadow prices of effort would be higher for  higher 
levels of  aggregate demand and vice versa, provided that effort is a binding variable. 
Also,  in all cases of demand conditions the shadow prices would fall as the level of 
available  effort increases. The  implication of  this  result is that when demand condition 
improves through  an  increase in the aggregate demand each unit of  effort would have 
a higher positive contribution to the net benefit. As  a result, the limit to which effort 
could be expanded in order to achieve higher net benefit simultaneously would be 
higher.  In other words, the shadow price of  effort would become zero at a higher level 
of  its use if  aggregate demand increases. Thus,  as seen earlier in Table 5.13,  the Table 5.16. Changes in the availability of effort for a 10% increase in the aggregate demand from the Base 
Model for  riverine fisheries of  Bangladesh. 
Level of total effort 
(gear hours x  lo6) 











Total catch (t)  37,760 
-direct catch  28,026 
-by-catch  9,734 
Total effortb (hours)  20,000 
Catch per effortC 
(kglgear hour x  10')  1,888 
Shadow price of  effort 
(BDTIgear hour x  lo3)  22.58 
'In  million Bangladesh Taka (US$1 = BDT32). 
b~n  gear hours x  lo6. 
'Ratio  of total catch to total effort. 
I  I  I  I  I  I  I 
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Total effort ( gear hours x 10' 1 
Fig.  5.19.  Net  benefit  and  effort  relationships  under  alternative  demand 
conditions. 
optimal level of  effort  is higher for increases in aggregate demand while lower for 
decreases in the aggregate demand. 
Implications 
The above  results of  cost and demand changes can be interpreted in terms of 
policy and factors that affect the bioeconomic and technological variables  as well as 
those  on the demand side of  the market. Such factors  include resource availability, 
CPUE, cost of  fishing  inputs, postharvest handling and processing costs,  and market 10%  decrease 
40  80  120  160  200  240- 
I 
Total effort  (gear  hours  x 10') 
Fig. 5.20. Shadow prices of  effort under alternative demand conditions. 
prices for fish  and fish  products.  In terms of  the  model any policy would result in some 
parametric changes to  the functional equations affecting directly or  indirectly the CPUE, 
cost  per unit of  effort and output,  and prices, (revenues and benefits).  For instance, the 
impact of  a stock reduction or stock enhancement can be viewed either in terms of  a 
change in the catchability coefficient or a proportionate change in the CPUE. This in 
turn would imply a proportionate change in the cost per unit of  catch. Similarly,  a 
technological change that would increase the fishing power of  the individual units of 
effort will  imply some change (a short-term increase) in CPUE and hence, a decrease 
in the cost per unit of  catch, if  not cost per unit of  effort. Further, a change in the price 
of  constituent effort will affect the cost per unit of  effort, and hence the cost per unit of 
catch. Similarly, changes in the aggregate demand and a change in consumer taste 
can  be viewed in terms of  a shift of the demand (intercept changes) and a change in 
the  slope of  the demand function,  respectively. In effect, almost all changes in policy or 
management variables  influence costs and or prices. CHAPTER 6 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND  CONCLUSION 
In Bangladesh riverine fisheries, the major concern is the presence of  an oversized 
effort capacity  (1 18%). Given that effort could be reduced to economically  efficient 
levels (represented by the results of  the  Base Model) the existing riverine fisheries are 
capable of  generating substantial  net benefits (BDT1,383 million per annum) of  which 
96%  accrues to  producer surplus.  Under the traditional  management through leasing to 
private individuals such benefitlsurplus is either lost (at least partly) due to the 
overcapacity of the fishing fleet or captured (partly) as monopoly profits by the lease 
holders who  act as middlemen between the resource owner  (government) and the 
fishers. The government gets only a token amount of  this benefit through  open auctions 
of  fishery  rights. 
Intervention into the system by a management entity capable of  controlling the 
intensity of  effort would help tap substantial  positive net benefits from these fisheries. 
The surpluses  could be used to  support management costs and the program of  effort 
reduction, including rehabilitation of  displaced workerslfishers.  The relative capacity of 
various fisheries and fishing grounds in generating this surplus  can be made a basis for 
taxing purposes. 
In the government's  ongoing thrust to manage fisheries through a restrictive 
licensing system (under the New Fisheries Management Policy) uniformity of  fees 
charged can be obtained by evaluating the relative benefit potentials of  fisheries across 
river systems and environments.  In other words,  a differential intensity has to be 
applied with regard to taxation. Thus, fisheries  and/ or fishing grounds which  have more 
benefit potential would require more taxation than those of  less potential.  On. the basis 
of the results obtained from the  Base Model, an estimate of the benefit potential of 
each individual fishery  can be made in terms of  producer surplus per unit of effort. 
Thus, the prawn fishery  can be ranked as having the largest potential (BDT13,925/gear 
hour x  1  06), followed by miscellaneous fish (BDT10,753lgear  hour x  lo6), catfish 
(BDT5,141/gear hour x  1  06), carp (BDT4,834/gear hour x  lo6) and hilsa (BDT4,015/gear 
hour x  106), respectively. Therefore,  the highest rate of taxation  should be on prawn 
fishing followed by miscellaneous fish,  catfish, carp, and hilsa fishing. 
Again, there are distributional implications of  this surplus: provided that the surpluses 
are not fully taxed away this will raise the income level of the sectoral participants who 
will be allowed to remain in the fishery. 
Finally, the present model sheds  light on issues that require careful consideration  in 
the government's management plans. Such issues include: ensuring a balance among 
regions and rivers in terms of  effort allocation and benefit generation,  and an equity in 
the distribution of  benefits among primary producers (fishers), the trading and 
middlemen communities, and consumers. 
While it is true that management can capture the fisheries  benefits either partly or 
wholly  through  an appropriate  rate of taxation on either  inputs (effort),  output or  both to 
maintain an optimal level of effort, it is also necessary to  improve landing, transport  and 
communication infrastructures to correct the discriminatory cost and revenue structures 
between regions of fish harvest as well as between sectoral participants (e.g.,  fishers and postharvest operators),  and thereby ensure a balance in the distribution of benefits 
and/or profits among interest groups. 
The previous chapters have developed a programming model of  a fishery sector 
through which  an  assessment of  the benefit potentials of  fisheries exploitation and its 
end uses can be evaluated. Application  of  a programming technique is productive to 
analyze behavior of  fisheries  under alternative technoeconomic and market (price) 
conditions.  However, despite the considerable extent in the programming framework of 
the  model, its implementation has been limited to  few  interacting elements in the fishery 
process. This is due to the shortage of  information on both biological and economic 
aspects of  the  riverine fisheries  of  Bangladesh. As  such, on the basis of  the short-run 
observations on the variables, the implications of  the results for  long-term behavioral 
stability  of  the fisheries  require testing by future investigations.  Particularly, model 
outputs  referring to  the yields and/or benefits that could be taken given an  increase of 
present fishing  effort must be taken with a grain of  salt, because the model did not 
consider the  impact of  reduced (adult) broodstock on the production of (juvenile) 
recruits. 
Such investigations would include scientific  assessments of  the level of  stocks of 
important species and its dependence on the regime of  the rivers, stock-recruitment 
relationships, study of  the relationship between gear heterogeneity and fishing mortality 
across species and seasons, and the analysis of  factors and channels of  postharvest 
activities.  If the  information necessary for the  analysis can be generated, the framework 
of  the  model can be expanded to  include other bioeconomic systems (e.g.,  beels, 
floodlands,  lakes and ponds). ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
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Tables 33 to 54 
Table 33 
Area  of  Large  Water  Bodies  in Each  Region  of 
Bangladesh by  District 
(sq km) 
Rivers and Estuaries 
Baor, 
Region/  Jarnuna-  Bee1  &  Grand 
~istrict  Meghna  Padma  B.Putra  Others Total Lakes  Total 
Northeast 
Sylhet  0 
Mymensingh  15 
Comilla  276 
Tangail 
Dhaka  143 
Southeast 








Raj  shahi 
Southwest 
Faridpur  14 
Patuakhali 




Total  740 
Source:  Water  Area  Statistics of  Bangladesh,  Fisheries 
Information Bulletin Vol.  2  (I), 1986.  DOF. Table 34 
Number of Fishing Units and Fishing Boats Operating in 
Different Riverine Waters of Bangladesh 
Meghna  Padma  J-B.putra Others 
Items  (River 1) (River 2) (River 3) (River 4)  Total 
Fishinq unitsa 
Dry Season  10,117  2,228  1,989  17,006  31,340 
(%I  3  2  7  6  54  100 
Wet Season  15,722  2,922  1,728  19,283  39,655 
4  0  7  4  4  9  100 
Average  12,920  2,575  1,859  18,145  35,498 
(%)  3  6  7  5  51  100 
Fishina 130atsb 24,641  9,049  3,065  N.A.  36,755 
(%  I  67  25  8  N.A.  100  --------------------------------------------------------  ........................................................ 
a:  estimated based on monthly sample survey of operating 
fishing units by BFRSS/DOF, Bangladesh for the period 
1985-86 and 1986-87. 
b: survey of fishing vilages and fishing boats by DOF. 
Table 35 
Distribution of Sample Fishing Units in the Selected 
Areas of Riverine Fishing in Bangladesh 
...................................................... 
River  No.  of  Sample as 
Group  River  District  Samples %  of boatsa  ...................................................... 
Riv 1: Lower Neghna  Comilla  50 
Barisal  60 
Upper Meghna  Dhaka  15 
Comilla  4  0 
sub-total:  165 
Riv 2:  Lower Padma  Faridpur  3  0 
Dhaka  20 
Upper Padma  Rajshahi  25 
sub-total:  75 
Riv 3: Jamuna-B.putra  Pabna  20 
Rangpur  55 
sub-total:  75 
Riv 4: Garai-Madumati  Faridpur  30 
Old Brahinaputra Mymensingh 30 
Tetulia  Barisal  4  0 
sub-total:  100 
ALL  Total  :  415 
.....................................................  ----------------------------------------------------- 
a: according to survey of fishing boats by DOF (unpub). Table 37 
Computed Average Cost of  Catch (AC)  Equations 
for Representative ~ishing  Units in 
Different Rivers of  Bangladesh 
by Species and Season 
Average Cost 
Species  Season  (AC)  Mean  S.D.  Mean  S.D. 
Prawn : 
-River 1 dry AC=64.74+.015q 
wet AC=73.80+.017q 
-River  2  dry AC=70.33+.017q 
wet AC=80.99+.017q 
-River  3  dry AC=10.38+.017q 
wet AC=24.17+.0017q 
-River  4  dry AC=30.36+.017q 
wet AC=26.36+.017q 
Catfish: 
-River  1 dry AC=14.29+.00145q 
wet AC=26.55+.0009q 
-River  2  dry AC=30.36+.145q 
wet AC=28.36-t. 0009q 
-River  3  dry AC=23.74+.00145q 
wet AC=28.98+.0009q 
-River  4  dry AC=10.91+.00145q 
wet AC=  8.91+.0009q 
Carp  : 
-River  1 dry AC=17.66+.0062q 
wet AC=28.00+.0009q 
-River  2  dry AC=22.43+.0062q 
wet AC=18,43+.0009q 
-River  3  dry AC=  5.88+.0062q 
wet AC=11.44+.0009g 
-River  4  dry AC=28.20+.0062q 
wet AC=16.20+.0009q 
Miscl  : 
-River  1 dry AC=l2.78+.00315q 
wet AC=lG.G9+.0017q 
-River  2  dry AC=  9,25+.00315q 
wet AC=  9.63+.0017q 
-River  3  dry AC=  6.70+.00315q 
wet AC=  5.28+.0017q 
-River  4  dry AC=  2.83+.00315q 
wet AC=  2.62+.0017q  ------------------------------  .............................. 
Source:  Based on estimated regression equations for 
sample fishing units. 
a: gear hours x lo6 
b:  amount in kg. Table  38 
Aggregate Average Cost of  Catch  (AC  )  Equations 
for Various  ~isheries  in the 
Rivers of  Bangladesh 
Species River  Season  AC  ~quations 
Hilsa  River 1 
River 2 
River  3 
River  4 
Prawn  River  1 
River  2 
River  3 
River  4 
Catfish River 1 
Carp 
Miscl. 
River  2 







River  2 










































Source:  computed  at  the average catch per annum  and 
based on  sample AC  equations in  Table 37- 
Note:  Q  =  total catch ('000  kg) AC  =  average cost/kg. Table 39 
Monthly Market  Margin  Equations for  various Species 
Landed  from ~ivers  of  Bangladesh 
by  Region  and Season 
Species  Region  Season  Equation 
Hilsa: 
Region  A:  Dry  MM1.1.1=  5.73-0.01539Q1.1.1 
Region  A:  Wet  MM1.1.2=  3.48-0.00085Q1.1.2 
Region  B:  All  MT41.2  =  6.98-0.00003Q1.2 
Region  C: All  MPI1.3  =  4.74-0.0076Q1.3 
Small Prawn: 
Region  A:  Dry  M134.1.1=16.00-0.0030Q4.1.1 
Region A:  Wet  MM4.1.2=18.54+0.00125Q4.1.2 
Region  B:  All MI44.2  =21.34+0.0033Q4.2 
Region  C:  All MM4.3  =18.97+0.03244.3 
Big Prawn: 
National:  All  MM8.0  =22.00f0.03748.0 
Carp : 
Region  A:  Dry  MM2.1.1=20.44-0.0104Q2.1.1 
Region  A:  Wet  MM2.1.2=16.68-0.0133Q2.1.2 
Region  B:  All MM2.2  =19.60-0.061Q2.2 
Region  C:  All MM2.3  =14.26+0.0022Q2.3 
Catfish: 
Region  A:  All  MM3.1  =  8.04-t-0.002Q3.1 
Region  B:  Dry  W13.2.1=  2.57f0.0063Q3.2.1 
Region  B:  Wet  MM3.2.2=  7.17-k0.0063Q3.2.2 
Region C:  All  MM3.3  =  1.58-tO.0106Q3.3 
Miscellaneous: 
Region  A:  All  MM5.1  =  7.72f0.0017Q5.1 
Region  B:  Dry  MM5.2.1=11.75+00034Q5.2.1 
Region  B:  Wet  MM5.2.2=  9.63f0.00034Q5.2.2 
Region  C:  All  MM5.3  =  7.22+0.0030Q5.3 
Source:  Derived  as the difference between  retail and 
ex-vessel  prices shown  in  Tables 11 and  12 
(Chapter V) . 
Note:  Q  =  quantity in thousand kg. Table 42 
Percentage of  BY-catch to Direct Catch from Various 
Fisheries in Different Rivers of 
Bangladesh  in Each Season 
Species of  Direct  Catch 
Species  I4ilsa  Prawn  Catfish  Carp  Miscl. 
of 

























..........................................................  ---------------------------------------------------------- 
Source:  Field Survey,  1987-88. Table 43 
Percentage  Distribution of  Harvest of  Various Species 
from  Each River to Different Regions of 
Bangladesh in  Each Fishing Season 
Wet Season  Dry Season 
Species  Reg.A  Reg.B  Reg.C  Tctal  Reg.A  Reg.B  Reg.C  Total 
Hilsa: 
-River  1 
-River  2 
-River  3 
-River  4 
Prawn : 
-River  1 
-River  2 
-River  3 
-River  4 
Catfish: 
-River 1 
-River  2 
-River  3 
-River  4 
Carp: 
-River  1 
-River  2 
-River  3 
-River  4 
Miscl. : 
-River  1 
-River  2 
-River  3 
-River  4 
Source:  Based on  Fish Catch Statistics by  species, 
district and river group (1983-84  -  1986-87), 
DOF/BFRSS  (unpublished) . Table 47 
Average Size of  Fishing Gear  (Net) Per Fishing 
Unit for Various Fisheries in 
the Rivers of  Bangladesh 
(sq m) 
Hilsa : 
-wet  season 
-dry  season 
Prawn: 
-wet  season 
-dry  season 
~atf  ish: 
-wet  season 
-dry  season 
Carp: 
-wet  season 
-dry  season 
Miscl. : 
-wet  season 
-dry  season 
Source:  Field survey  (1987-88) . Table 48 
Changes in Aggregate Effort (gear hours x lo6) Availability in the Base Model for 
Riverine Fisheries of Bangladesh 
Items  Hilsa Prawn Catfish  Carp Miscl.  All  Hilsa Przwn Catfish Carp  Miscl.  All  ................................................................................................ 
~enef  it-costa 
Net Benefit  115.0  121.1  36.5  29.6 
GrossBenefit  216.33640104.0  70.5 
Producer Surplus 
(Pas)  102.9  119.8  36.3  29.1 
Consumer Surplus 
(C.S.)  12.1  1.2  0.2  0.5 
Total Revenue  204.1  362.8  103.9  70.0 
Total Cost  101.3  243.0  67.6  40.9 
-Harvest  51.3  131.3  43.1  12.0 
-Post-harvest  50.0  111.7  24.4  28.9 
Cztch-Effort 
Total catch (mt) 7,715 5,573 3,547 1,353 18,521  36,709 12,291 10,483 6,059 1,883 29,450  60,166 
-directcatch  6,000 4,1203,200  91014,150  28,380  9,294  8,1605,5201,13421,596  45,704 
-by-catch  1,715 1,453  647  443  4,371  8,329  2,997  2,323  539  749  7,854  14,462 
Total effort  5,570 3,763 2,405  988  7,274  20,000  9,130  8,003 5,531 1,364 15,982  40,000 
~atchl~ffort~ 
(kg/gear  hour 
x lo6)  1,0771,0951,331  921  1,945  1,835  1,018  1,020  998  838  1,351  1,504 
Price,and Unit Cost (~D~lkg) 
price  26.46  48.94  29.28  51.77  29.1  26.38  48.45  29.21  51.47  29.01 
Harvest Cost  6.65  23.55  12.15  8.86  4.75  8.87  6.53  26.62  15.7  9.42  6.16  10.86 
Post-~arvest  Cost 6.48  20.04  6.89  21.37  9.65  10.73  6.49  20.74  6.78  15.63  10.18  11.09 Table 49 
~ehaviour  of Different Fisheries in the Rivers of Bangladesh 
Under Alternative Cost  Conditions 
(Changes in the Cost of  ~arvesting  from the Base Model) 
I==="P=PPtl=====aP======P=I=========================================================================s== 
BASE MODEL  253 inctease 
Items  Hilsa Prawn Catfish  Carp  Kiscl.  All  Wilsa Prawn Catfish Carp  Miscl.  ~ll  ____--_____------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
~enefit-costa 
Net Benefit  497.7  246.7  49.5  80.4  508.8  1,383.2  280.3  154.9  7.7  51  -1  434.5  928.5 
Gross benefit 2,025.4  l,21  9.5  271.2  359.1  1,758.8  5,634.1  1,509.0  747.5  248.3  277.2  ,370.6  4,152.5 
Producer Surplus 
(P.S.  1  446.6  234.0  48.5  66.2  493.7  1,288-9  249.2  149.5  6.7  42.9  425.1  873.4 
Consunar Surplus 
(C.S. )  51.1  12.8  1.1  14.2  15.2  94.3  31.0  5.5  1.0  8.3  9.4  55.1 
Total Revenue 1,974.3  1,206.8  270.2  344.9  1,743.6  5,539.8  1,478.0  742.1  247.3  268.9  1,361  -2  4,097.4 
Total Cost  1,527.8  972.8  221.7  278.7  1,250.0  4,250.9  1,228.7  592.6  240.6  226.0  936.1  3,224.0 
-Harvest  1,017.5  574.7  159.6  161.2  522.1  2,435.2  851.2  350.3  182.9  136.8  407.5  1,928.7 
-post-harvest  510.3  398.0  62.1  117.5  727.9  1,815.7  377.5  242.2  57.7  89.3  528.6  1,295.3 
Catch-Effort 
Total Catch 
(mt  78,161  17,981  9,281  7,113  60,627 173,163  57,710  11,440 8,406 5,439  47,150 130,225 
-direct catch  70,350  13,850 7,960  5,741  41,956 139,857  52,560  8,200 7,520 4,588  31,800 104,668 
-by-catch  7,811  4,131  1,321  1,372  18,671  33,306  5,150  3,240  966  851  15,350  25,557 
Total ~ffort~  111.321  16,804 9,336 13,654  45,939 197,054  77,045  8.050  8,436 9,294  28,668 131,493 
Catch/~ffort~ 
(kg/gear hour 
x lo6)  632  824  853  421  91  3  879  682  1,079  891  494  1,109  990 
price.and  Unit Cost (BDT/X~] 
price0  25.26  47.79  29.11  48.49  28.76  25.61  48.37  29.14  49.44  28.87 
Harvest Cost  13.02  31.96  17.20  22.67  8.61  14.06  14.75  30.62  21.55  25.15  8.64  8.87 
Post-harvest 
cost  6.53  22.14  6.69  15.51  12.01  10.49  6.54  21.17  6.80  16.41  11.21  10.73 
---------5-------------------P------------------------------------------------------------------------  ___I_-_--  --------_----------  ...................................................................... Table 49  (continued ...) 
I  terns  Hilsa  Prawn Catfish Carp  Miscl.  All  Hilsa  Prawn  Catfish  Carp  Miscl.  All  --_------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
~enefit-costa 
Net Benefit  197.6  126.7  0.8  37.6  278.9  641.6  808.8  416.9  96.1  127.2  809.1  2,258.0 
Gross ben.  7,040.7  470.7  176.5  184.5  1,168.6  3,041.0  2,648.1  1,956.5  312.9  51  9.6  2,661.8  8,098.9 
P.S.  184.4124.8  0.4  34.1  272.6  616.3  719.2  385.2  94.8  97.0  357.01,653.2 
C.S.  13.1  1.8  0.4  3.6  6.3  25.3  89.6  31.6  1.3  30.2  452.1  604.8 
T.  Rev.  1,027.5  468.8  176.1  180.9  1,162.3  3,015.7  2,558.5  1,924.8  311.6  489.4  2,209.8  7,494.1 
T.  Cost  843.1  344.0  175.7  146.9  889.72,399.41,839.31,539.6  216.8  392.4  1,852.7  5,840.9 
-Harvest  583.7  197.9  135.2  88.9  450.8  1,456.5  1,174.1  854.8  145.2  222.5  521.8  2,918.5 
-Post-harvest  259.5  146.1  40.5  58.0  438.9  943.0  665.2  684.8  71.6  169.9  1,331.0  2,922.5 
Catch-Ef  fort 
T.  Catch(nt1  39,642  7,152  6,024  3,583  40,177  96,578  103,000  28,648  10,718  10,514  77184  230,064 
-direct catch 35,000  4,146  5,320  2,758  30,139  77,363  92,483  23,670  8,850  8,757  50500  184,260 
-by-catch  4,6423,006  704  825  10,038  19,215  10,517  4,978  1,863  1,757  26,684  45,804 
Tot21 l2ff0rtb 43,938  3,789  5,306  5,179  26,459  84,671  173,194  33,931  11,069  23,514  61,393  303,101 
~atch/~ffort'  797  1,094  1,003  533  1,139  1,141  534  698  800  372  a23  759 
Price-and  Unit COS~(DDT/RCJ) 
priceu  25.92  48.79  29.23  50.50  28.93  24.84  46.81  29.07  46.55  28.63 
Harvest Cost  14.72  27.67  22.45  24.80  11.22  15-08  11  -40  29.84  13.55  21  -17  6.76  12.69 
Post-har.  Cost  6.54  20.42  6.72  16.20  10.92  9.76  6.46  23.90  6.68  16.16  17.24  12.70 
------------------------=----------------=----------------------------------------------------------  ........................  ---------------- .......................................................... Table  49  (continued ...) 
Items  Hilsa  Prawn  Catfish  Carp  M~SC~.  All 
~enef  it-costa 




T.  Rev. 




T.  Catch  132,070  45,837 12,433 15,711  98795  305,646 
-dir.  catch 110,255  38,962 10,071 13,355  65229  245,872 
-by-catch  14,615  6,875  2,362  2,356  33,566  59,774 
T. J2ffortb  275,011  66,037 13,609 41,734  86,972  483,363 
Catch/EffortC 
(kg/gear hour 
x  lo6)  430  530  740  320  750  632 
price  ,and  Unit Cost  (BDrl?/Kg) 
priceU  24.33  45.18  29.02  43.58  28.46 
a: million Bangladesh Taka  (BDT) 
b:  gear hours x  lo6. 
c:  ratio of direct catch to  total effort. 
d:  in the case of prawn  practice indicates that of  only small 
prawns,  price of big prawn  is fixed at BDT177/kg. Table 50 
Changes in the ~vailability  of Effort  (gear  hours x lo6) for a 25% Increase in the Cost of 
Harvest from the Base Model for Riverine Fisheries of Bangladesh 
Itens  Hilsa Prawn Catfish Cerp Pliscl.  All  Ailsa Prawn Catfish Carp Miscl.  All  ................................................................................................ 
~enef  it-costa 
Net Benefit  89.6  85.2  25.8  34.9  260.4  495.8  182.9123.1  20.1  42.2  306.9  675.3 
Gross benefit  203.5  328.6 
Producer Surplus 89.3  84.3 
Consumer Surplus  0.3  0.9 
Total Revenue  203.2  327.7 
Totzl Cost  113.9  243.4 
-Harvest  64.1  142.3 
Catch-Effort 
Total Catch(nt1 7.691  5.023 
-direct catch .  6:000  3:  561 
-by-catch  1,691  1,462 
Total Effort  5.570  3.261 
catch/~ffort'  1  ;077  1  ;092 
Shadow Price 
Price-and Unit Cost  (BDT/K~) 
Price"  26.42  48.99  29.28  51.75  29.09 Table 50  (continued ...) 
I terns  Hilsa Prawn  Catfish Carp  Miscl.  All  Hilsa  Prawn  Catfish Carp  Miscl.  All 
~enef  it-costa 
Net Ben.  273.8  146.6  22.9  56.7  370.1  869.9  294.1  158.4  9.7  51.1  413.3  926.5 
Gross ben.  894.7  727.9  184.6  184.4  1,196.2  3,187.8  1,361.9  745.0  247.0  270.5  1,330.3  3,954.0 
P.S.  263.7  141.4  22.3  53.1  363.4  843.9  271.5  153.0  8.7  43.3  407.6  884.0 
C.S.  10.0  5.2  0.6  3.5  6.7  26.1  22.6  5.4  1.0  7.9  5.6  42.5 
T.  Rev.  884.7  722.7  184.0  180.9  1,189.5  3,161.8  1,339.3  739.6  246.0  262.6  1,324.7  3,912.1 
T.  Cost  621.0  581.3  151.8  127.8  826.1  2,317.9  1,067.8  586.6  237.3  219.3  917.03,028.1 
-Harvest  398.2  318.8  118.9  69.7  374.2  1,309.8  726.5  348.8  180.0  132.3  407.5  3,020.1 
-Post-harvest  222.0  232.6  42.9  58.0  451.9  1,008.1  341.3  237.9  57.4  87.0  509.5  1,233.0 
Catch-Effort 
T. Catch  34,014 11,169  6,302  3582  41,130  96,197  52,112 11,397 8,442  5,303  45,868 123,122 
-dir.  catch  29,228  8,160  5,520 2,673  30,059  75,640  46,978  8,160 7,520  4,251  31,800  98,709 
-by-catch  4,786  3,009  782  909  11,071  20,557  5,134  3,237  922  1,052  14,068  24,413 
T. Effort  35,280  8,003  5,531 4,816  26,370  80,000  65.816  8,003 8,436  9,077  28,668 120,000 
~atch/~f  f  orcc 
(kg/gear  hour 
X  lo6)  828  1,020  998  555  1,140  1,202  714  1,020  891  468  1,109  1,026 
Shadow Price 
(BDT/gear  hour x 103)  3.25  0.2 
?rice,and  Unit Cost  (BDT/x~) 
price"  26.01  48-40  29.20  50.50  28.92  25.70  48.37  29.14  49.52  28-88 
Iiarvest Cost  11.71  31.23  18.87  19.47  9.10  13.62  13.94  30.60  21 -32 24.96  8.88  24.59 
Post-har.  Cost  6.53  6.53  6.53  6.53  6.53  6.53  6.53  6.53  6.53  6.53  6.53  6.53  ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  .................................................................................................... Table 50  (continued ...) 
Items  Milsa  Prawn  catfish Carp  ~iscl. All 
~enefit-costa  --- 
Net Ben.  280.3  154.9  7.7  51.1  434.4  928.5 
Gross ben.  1,509.0  747.5  248.3  277.2  1,370.6  4,152.5 
P.S.  249.2  149.5  6.7  42.9  425.1  873.4 
C.S.  31.0  5.5  1.0  8.3  9.4  55.1 
T.  Rev.  1,478.0  742.1  247.3  268.9  1,361.2  4,097.4 
T.  Cost  3.,228.7  592.6  240.6  226.0  936.1  3,224.0 
-Harvest  851.2  350.3  182.9  136.8  407.5  1,928.7 
-Post-harv.  377.5  242.2  57.7  89.3  528.6  1,295.3 
Catch-Ef fort 
T.  Catch  57,710  11,440  8,486  5,439  47,150  130,225 
-dir.  catch 52,560  8,200  7,520  4,588  31,800  104,668 
-by-catch  5,150  3,240  966  851  15,350  25,557 
T.  I2ffortb  77,045  8,050  8,436  9,294  20,668  131,493 
CatchlEffortC 
(kg/gear hour 
x  lo6)  682  1,019  891  494  1,109  990 
Shadow  Price 
(BDT/gear hour  x  lo3)  0 
Price and Unit Cost  (BDT/ICg)  ----a  Price  25.61  48.37  29.14  49.44  28.87 
Harvest Cost  14.75  30.62  21.55  25.15  8.64  8.87 
Post-har.Cost  6.54  21.17  6.80  16.41  11.21  10.73 
a: million Bangladesh  Taka  (BDT). 
b:  gear hours x lo6. 
c: ratio of direct catch to total effort. 
d:  in the case of  prawn  practice indicates that of  only 
small prawns,  price of  big prawn  is fixed at BDT177/kg. Table 51 (continued ...) 
L =  200,000  E =  303,101 
Species  Spscies 
Items  Hilsa  Pram Catfish Carp  Miscl.  All  Ulsa  Prawn  Catfish Carp  Miscl.  All 
~enef  it-costd 
Net Benefit  748.26  454.22  90.46  131.74  700.92 
Gross benefit  1,824.16 
P.S  707.26 
C.S.  41 -00 
Total Revenue  1,783.1  6 
Total Cost  7,075.90 
-Harvest  618.13 
-Post-harvest  457.77 
Catch-Effort 
Total Catch  (mt) 70,203 
-direct  catch  59,669 
-by-catch  10,534  4,814  1,545  1,586  21,090 
Total Effort 
(Kg  6  8  1  717  806  476  81  8  920  534  698  800  372  823  759 
Shadow Price  2.72  0 
Price and Unit COS~(BDT/K~) 
a: million BDT; b:  gear hours  x lo6;  c: ratio of  direct catch  (in kg)  to  total effort; 
d:  as for prawn  price indicates that of  only small prawns;  price of  big prawn  is fixed atBDT177/kg. Table  52 
Behaviour of  Different Fisheries in the Rivers of  Bangladesh 
under Alternative Demand  Conditions 
(Changes in the demand  intercept from  the BASE  MODEL) 
Benefit-Cost  a 
P 
Net Benefit  497.65  246.73  49.54  80.42  508.83  1,303.17  773.20  340.33  77.19  121  -47  787.05  2,099.24 
Gross benefit 2,025.40 1,219.51  271  .24 359.11  1,758.81  5,634.07 2,452.00 1,713.91  334.97  494.40  2,941  .I3 7,936.41 
Producer Surplus 
(P.S. )  446.60  233.98  48.47  66.22  493.65  1,288.92  711.78  318.42  75.64  99.82  290.41  1,496.08 
Consumer  Surplus 
(C.S.)  51 -05  12.75  1 .07  14.20  15.18  94.25  61.42  21 .91  1.55  21 -65  496.64  603.16 
Total Revenue  1,974.35  1,206.76 270.17 344.91  1,743.63 5,539.82 2,390.58 1,692.00 333.42  472.75  2,444-49  7,333.25 
Total Cost  1,527.75  972.78 221  -70  278.69 1,249.98 4,250.90 1,678.80 1,373.58  257.78  372.93  2,154.08 5,837.17 
-Harvest  1,077.47  574.74  159.61  161.22  522.132,435.17 1,123.17  826.45 180.44  228.20  819.20  3,185.46 
-Post-harvest  510-28  398.04  62.09 117.47  727.85 1,815.73  555.63  547.13  69.34  144.73  1,334.88 2,651  -71 
Catch-Ef fort 
Totalcatch (at)78,161  17,981  9,281  7,113  60,627  173,163  86,023  23,720  10413  8,974  77,480  206,610 
-direct  catch  70,350  13,850  7,960  5,741  41,956  139,857  74,900  18,560  8,730  7,333  55,324  164,847 
-by-catch  7,011  4,131  1,321  1,372  18,671  33,306  11,123  5,160  1,683  1,641  22,156  41,753 
Total Effort'  111  ,321  16,804  9,336 13,654  45,939  197,054  122,932  24,205 10,837 17,723  72,298  247,995 
Catch/EffortC 
(kq/gear hour 
x  -lo6)  632  824  053  421  91  3  879  6  0  9  767  806  41  4  7  6  5  8  3  3 
Price,and  Unit cost  (BDT/X~) 
?riceL'  25.26  47.79  29.11  48.49  28.76  27.79  52.21  32.02  52.68  31.55 
Harvest Cost  13.02  31.96  17.20  22.67  8.61  14.06  13.06  34-84 18.10  25.43  10.57  15.42 
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